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DECONCENTRATING THE INNER CITY POOR
MICHAEL

H. SCHILL*

On Wednesday, April 29, 1992, low income, predominantly minority residents of several inner city neighborhoods rioted in the streets of
Los Angeles following the jury acquittal of police officers who had beaten
a young black man. By the time peace was restored to these communities, over 50 people had been killed, 2,383 had been injured and 17,000
had been arrested.' Over one thousand buildings had been burnt to the
ground during the riots and in excess of three quarters of a billion dollars
2
of property damage had been incurred.
The Los Angeles riots dramatically and tragically illustrate the precarious situation of many large American cities as we enter the last decade of the twentieth century. Much of the preceding decade was a period
of seeming prosperity. Large cities outside of the southwest experienced
building booms, burgeoning tax revenues and rapidly increasing budgets.
By 1992, these boom years have receded into memory. A national recession, the collapse of the real estate market, cutbacks in federal intergovernmental assistance and the ravages of social problems ranging from the
spread of AIDS and homelessness to drug addiction and drug-related
violence have silenced those who had, only a few years earlier, heralded
3
the end of the urban crisis.
Although far from public consciousness during the expansionary
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Bob Ellickson, Lani
Guinier, Seth Kreimer, Rick Lempert, Gerry Neuman and the participants of the New York University School of Law Legal Studies Workshop for their comments on an earlier draft. The research
assistance of Bill Carter and Mark Sargent and financial assistance from the U.P.S. Public Policy
Initiatives Fund and the Institute For Law and Economics of the University of Pennsylvania are
greatly appreciated.
This paper was prepared for the John M. Olin Foundation Conference on the Law and Economics of Urban Issues, University of Virginia School of Law, November 8-9, 1991.

1.See Victor Merina, A Story of Refugee Success Ended Tragically in Riots, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
17, 1992, at Al; Bill Boyarsky, Understandingthe Riots Part 1: The Path to Fury, L.A. TIMES, May
It, 1992, at Ti1.
2. Carla Lazzareschi, Riot Job-Loss Figure is Halved, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at DI; see
Michael Meyers et al., Path of Destruction, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1992, at A31; Boyarsky, supra note
1, at T11.
3. See, e.g., Roy Bahl etal., The New Anatomy of Urban FiscalProblems, in THE FUTURE OF
NATIONAL URBAN POLICY 32, 54 (Marshall Kaplan & Franklin James eds., 1990) ("[S]evere urban

fiscal crises have not materialized in the 1980s."); Donna E. Shalala & Julia Vitullo-Martin, Rethinking the Urban Crisis:Proposalsfor a National Urban Agenda, 55 AM. PLAN. ASS'N J. 3 (1989)
("It is unlikely that fundamental fiscal crises will hit major cities again.").
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years of the 1980s, the problems of persistent inner city poverty grew
increasingly virulent. In the shadow of shiny new office buildings and
food emporiums, the proportion of central city residents whose incomes
were below the officially designated poverty level increased. 4 Even more
disheartening, in many cities the concentration and isolation of the poor
has increased. 5 A disproportionate share of these poor households are
6
composed of racial minorities, particularly blacks.
In this article, I revisit the debate over what legislators and judges
can do to alleviate the problem of concentrated inner city poverty. In
Part I, I examine the nature of concentrated inner city poverty and some
of its consequences. Many social scientists have attributed the growth
and persistence of urban poverty to the so-called "spatial mismatch" hypothesis. 7 This theory posits that poor people living in the inner city are
disadvantaged by the location in the suburbs of firms that have traditionally provided low-skilled jobs. Since the bulk of the metropolitan poor
population live in the city and cannot move to the suburbs because of
discrimination and a lack of affordable housing, the hypothesis suggests
that the mismatch between location of residence and employment leads
to lower wages and increased unemployment. Concentrated poverty, in
turn, generates social problems different in both magnitude and kind
from those usually associated with low incomes.
In Part II, I examine the predominant approaches of courts and legislators to the spatial mismatch of jobs and residences and the problems
of concentrated poverty. In response to the Los Angeles riots, politicians
of both political parties embraced enrichment strategies that would increase employment and educational opportunities for poor households by
increasing resources for inner city communities and providing incentives
for job creation. Some have referred to enrichment programs as a jobsto-people strategy. A second approach, deconcentration, is a mirror image of enrichment. Deconcentration advocates seek to facilitate the
movement of poor households to locations where educational and employment opportunities are greater than the central city. Instead of
bringing jobs to people, deconcentration policies seek to bring people to
4. See Paul E. Peterson, The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 3, 7 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (noting the proportion of households below the poverty line in central cities increased from 9.8% in 1970 to 14.0% in 1980 to
15.4% in 1987).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 10-19.

6. See infra text accompanying notes 18-19.
7. The first article to attempt to demonstrate the empirical validity of the spatial mismatch
hypothesis was John F. Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment and Metropolitan Decentralization, 82 Q.J. EcON. 175 (1968).
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jobs. Although deconcentration is by no means unproblematic, I conclude that a strategy geared to facilitate the movement of poor households from inner cities to suburbs offers more hope of improving their
lives than enrichment approaches.
In Part III of this article, I examine how the law facilitates or impedes efforts to deconcentrate the inner city poor. With the exception of
the Fair Housing Act,8 federal law does little to promote deconcentration
and in some instances, actually acts as a roadblock. Some state courts
and legislators seem more willing and able to promote deconcentration,
although their efforts, to date, have borne little fruit. Interestingly, one
area where state courts and legislators have acted most actively and, perhaps, most effectively to promote deconcentration appears at first glance
to promote enrichment instead. Recent court cases requiring states to
equalize educational resources among school districts may not only take
away some of the incentives of suburbs to zone poor people out, but they
may also increase the incentives for poor people to move out of the central city.
I.

CONCENTRATED GHETTO POVERTY

After a period of relative disinterest, issues of urban poverty are
once again finding their way onto the agendas of academics and policymakers. 9 Among the demographic and spatial trends of most concern in
the nation's largest cities is the increasing concentration of poor people in
certain inner city neighborhoods. Concentrated ghetto poverty is caused
by several forces including race discrimination and the transformation of
the urban economy. Large central cities have lost much of their industrial and manufacturing employment bases to the suburbs. Low-skilled
jobs in this sector have been replaced by jobs requiring higher levels of
education than possessed by many residents of inner city neighborhoods.
Housing discrimination, inadequate transportation and the lack of affordable housing in suburban locations have made it impossible for the
inner city poor to move to areas of greater opportunity resulting in a
spatial mismatch of jobs and residences.
Concentrated ghetto poverty generates social problems that are
more severe and in some ways different from the ordinary problems fac8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
9. Much of the credit for this renewed interest in urban affairs is attributable to the publication in 1987 of a book by Wilson examining the growing problems of inner city blacks. See WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:

THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS,

AND

PUBLIC POLICY (1987). For a discussion of Wilson's hypotheses see infra text accompanying notes
47-53.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:795

ing poor people. Among these "concentration effects" are persistent joblessness and high levels of teenage pregnancy, school dropouts, drug
abuse and crime.
A.

The Growth of Concentrated Ghetto Poverty

Despite using different methodologies to examine inner city poverty,
social scientists are in agreement that concentrated ghetto poverty has
grown in recent years. Jargowsky and Bane find that from 1970 to 1980,
the number of people with incomes below the poverty level living in census tracts where over 40% of the population are poor increased 29.5%
from 1.9 million to 2.4 million. 10 Similarly, recent articles by Hughes"
and Weicher 12 demonstrate that the number of poverty census tracts increased substantially between 1970 and 1980.13 Nathan and Adams further show that the increase in concentrated ghetto poverty did not abate
in the 1980s. They find that the proportion of central city poor living in
neighborhoods where 20% or more of the residents had incomes below
the poverty level increased dramatically from 39.9% in 1980 to 56.8% in
1986.14

Each of these studies' findings of increased numbers of ghetto poor
and poverty levels in recent years masks considerable regional and racial
differences. Jargowsky and Bane report that the ten metropolitan areas
that have the highest concentration of ghetto poor account for almost
one-half of the national total. 15 Ghetto poverty increased "dramatically"
in large northern cities and decreased "equally dramatically" in many
cities located in the South. 16 Hughes confirms the regional nature of concentrated ghetto poverty by showing that the cities with the greatest
10. See Paul A. Jargowsky & Mary J. Bane, Ghetto Poverty in the United States, 1970-1980, in
THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 235, 253 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).

11. See Mark A. Hughes, Misspeaking Truth to Power: A GeographicalPerspective on the "Underclass" Fallacy, 65 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 187, 194 (1989).
12. See John C. Weicher, How Poverty NeighborhoodsAre Changing, in INNER-CITY POVERTY
IN THE UNITED STATES 68, 70 (Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. & Michael G.H. McGeary eds., 1990).

13. Hughes and Weicher use different criteria for classifying census tracts that contain concentrated poverty. Hughes defines an impacted ghetto census tract as one whose percentage of (1)
families with children headed by females, (2) males who worked less than 26 weeks during the
previous year, (3) households receiving public assistance and (4) older teenagers not in high school
and not holding high school diplomas exceeds twice the median level of the surrounding metropolitan area. See Hughes, supra note 11, at 193. Weicher characterizes a census tract as a poverty tract
if 20% or more of its residents have incomes below the poverty line. See Weicher, supra note 12, at
69.
14. See Richard P. Nathan & Charles F. Adams, Jr., FourPerspectives on Urban Hardship, 104
POL. Sci. Q. 483, 503 (1989). Nathan and Adams estimate that the number of central city poor
living in 20% poverty areas increased from 884,000 in 1980 to 1,614,000 in 1986. Id.
15. See Jargowsky & Bane, supra note 10, at 254.
16. See id. at 269.

1991]

DECONCENTRA TING THE INNER CITY POOR

number of impacted ghetto tracts were, in decreasing order, Philadel17
phia, Detroit, Chicago, Baltimore, Cleveland and Washington, D.C.
Concentrated ghetto poverty is a condition that affects black households with much greater frequency than those who are white. According
to Nathan and Adams, in 1986, 75.5% of all poor black households in
central cities lived in census tracts where over 20% of the population was
poor compared to 43.3% of all poor urban white households.' 8 Jargowsky and Bane find that in 1980, "65% of the ghetto poor were black,
22% Hispanic and 13% non-Hispanic white and other races."' 9
B.

Concentrated Ghetto Poverty and the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis

The spatial mismatch hypothesis suggests that the increase in concentrated inner city poverty is partially attributable to the lack of correspondence between the places poor people live and the location of job
opportunities. 20 Over the past three decades, central cities have experienced an exodus of low-skilled jobs to the suburbs, other regions and
overseas. The spatial mismatch hypothesis holds that these jobs are inaccessible to the inner city poor because high housing costs and housing
discrimination make it impossible for these households to move nearby.
Public transportation networks are insufficient to transport the poor
from their inner city locations to workplaces in the suburbs. Proponents
of the spatial mismatch hypothesis also argue that potential employees
17. See Hughes, supra note 11, at 194. As a proportion of all census tracts in the metropolitan
area, the cities with the most impacted ghetto tracts were Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore, Cleveland, Atlanta and Toledo. Id.
18. See Nathan & Adams, supra note 14, at 504.
19. See Jargowsky & Bane, supra note 10, at 252.
20. I do not mean to suggest that the spatial mismatch between jobs and residences provides a
complete explanation for persistent inner city poverty. Racial discrimination limits the opportunities
of minorities, regardless of whether they live in central cities or suburbs. See David T. Ellwood, The
SpatialMismatch Hypothesis: Are There Teenage Jobs Missing in the Ghetto?, in THE BLACK YOUTH
EMPLOYMENT CRISIS 147, 149 (Richard B. Freeman & Harry J. Holzer eds., 1986). Furthermore,
commentators such as Charles Murray have suggested that social welfare programs designed to help
the poor have been the major cause of increased poverty by reducing incentives for individuals to
work and encouraging them to engage in activities that limit their future employment prospects. See
CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980, at 154-66 (1984).

Although current levels of public assistance do affect work incentives, see Sheldon Danziger et al.,
How Income Transfer ProgramsAffect Work, Savings and the Income Distribution:A CriticalReview,
19 J. ECON. LIT. 975, 1019 (1981) (Current programs reduce the aggregate labor supply by less than
4.8%.); Irwin Garfinkel & Larry L. Orr, Welfare Policy and the Employment Rate ofAFDC Mothers,
27 NAT'L TAX J. 275, 282-83 (1974) (indicating AFDC levels have a significant effect on employment rates), Murray's thesis linking increased levels of poverty to social welfare programs has been
roundly criticized as contrary to the facts. See, e.g., Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk, The
Poverty of Losing Ground, CHALLENGE, May-June 1985, at 32; David T. Ellwood & Lawrence H.
Summers, Is Welfare Really the Problem?, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1986, at 56; Robert Greenstein,
Losing Faith in "Losing Ground", NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 25, 1985, at 12; Christopher Jencks, How
Poor Are The Poor?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 9, 1985, at 41.
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living in the central city are at a disadvantage in learning about the existence of jobs in the suburbs.
The spatial mismatch hypothesis has been subjected to a substantial
amount of empirical research. Although the results of these tests are not
all consistent, the weight of the evidence supports the argument that the
location of inner city poor households, especially black households living
in the older cities of the North and Midwest, creates a disadvantage for
them in escaping poverty. 2 1 One set of studies conducted by Kasarda
examines the changing structure of employment in six metropolitan areas: Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, New York and Philadelphia.
These studies show that the spatial pattern of job creation and loss follows a consistent pattern. From 1970 to 1980, the central cities of each
of these metropolitan areas lost large numbers of jobs in the occupational
categories of clerical, sales and blue-collar employment. The largest
share of jobs lost in each city were those involved in manufacturing and
the production of goods. 22 In their place, a substantial number of managerial, professional and technical jobs were created. In contrast, the suburbs of each of these central cities added large numbers of jobs in almost
23
all occupational categories.
The economic transformation of these central cities from centers of
manufacturing and production to centers of information exchange and
finance has had a profoundly negative effect on lower income households.
Most of these potential employees have achieved no more than a high
school education; in fact, a large proportion have dropped out of high
school prior to graduation. 24 Nevertheless, the qualifications for entry
21. See, e.g., EDWIN S. MILLS & BRUCE W. HAMILTON, URBAN ECONOMICS 393 (4th ed.
1989) (The "most plausible" explanation for the deteriorating labor market condition of central city
blacks is the spatial mismatch hypothesis.); Harry J. Holzer, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: What
Has the Evidence Shown?, 28 URB. STUD. 105 (1991) ("It seems fair to say, therefore, that the
preponderance of evidence from data of the last decade shows that spatial mismatch has a significant
effect on black employment."). But see Christopher Jencks & Susan E. Mayer, ResidentialSegregation, Job Proximity,and Black Job Opportunities, in INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES,
187, 218 (Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. & Michael G.H. McGeary eds., 1990) (The findings of empirical
studies on the spatial mismatch hypothesis "tell a very mixed story.").
22. See John D. Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass, 501 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 26, 29 (1989) [hereinafter Urban Industrial Transition]; see also Keith R.
Ihlanfeldt & David L. Sjoquist, The Impact of Job Decentralization on the Economic Welfare of
CentralCity Blacks, 26 J. URB. ECON. 110, 113 (1989) (From 1970 to 1980, the central city shares of
unskilled jobs fell in each of the nation's ten largest metropolitan areas except Los Angeles.).
23. See Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition, supra note 22, at 29-30; see also Jonathan S.
Leonard, The Interaction of Residential Segregation and Employment Discrimination, 21 J. URB.
EcON. 323, 343-44 (1987) (From 1974 to 1980, blue-collar employment in the Chicago metropolitan
region fell 4% in the ghetto, 2% in the zone 5 miles away from the ghetto and increased 2% outside
this 5 mile zone.).
24. See, e.g., Jargowsky & Bane, supra note 10, at 249 (In 1980, the median number of school
years completed by ghetto blacks in Memphis and Philadelphia were 9.5 and 10.8, respectively.);
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level jobs in close proximity to their residences have increased substantially often including a college degree. 2 5 The traditional stepping-stone
of the urban working class, manufacturing jobs, are now located in the
suburbs, 26 out of the reach of large numbers of inner city households who
do not own cars. 27 Public transportation is generally geared to moving
people from the suburbs to employment centers in the cities. Given the
dispersed nature of jobs in the suburbs, existing public transportation is
inadequate to enable many inner city residents to reach jobs for which
28
they are qualified.
A second set of studies providing support for the spatial mismatch
hypothesis examines the effect of inner city residence on employment and
earnings. Kain's 1968 study was the first to test whether the spatial mismatch of jobs and residences reduces the employment of inner city residents. 29 Kain examines data from Chicago and Detroit and finds that

the black share of employment was significantly higher in black neighborhoods close to the major ghettos than in neighborhoods farther
away. 30 He concludes that blacks probably suffer a significant job loss as
3
a result of residential segregation. 1
A 1986 study by Ellwood calls into question Kain's conclusions that
Frank Newman etal., Reengaging State and Federal Policymakers in the Problems of Urban Education, in THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL URBAN POLICY 61, 68 (Marshall Kaplan & Franklin James

eds., 1990) (Overall drop-out rate in Chicago public schools for the Class of 1982 is 43%.).
25. See John D. Kasarda, Structural Factors Affecting the Location and Timing of Urban Underclass Growth, 11 URB. GEOGRAPHY 234, 247 (1990) [hereinafter Urban Underclass Growth];
Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition, supra note 22, at 33.
26. In addition to locating in the suburbs, manufacturing firms have frequently moved to other
regions of the nation or abroad. See John D. Kasarda, Jobs, Migration, and Emerging Urban Mismatches, in URBAN CHANGE AND POVERTY 148, 158-68 (Michael G.H. McGeary & Laurence E.

Lynn, Jr. eds., 1988) (describing regional patterns of employment growth and decline).
27. See Kasarda, Urban Underclass Growth, supra note 25, at 253-54 (proportions of unemployed black males living in households with no private vehicle in New York, Philadelphia and
Chicago in 1980 were 72%, 54% and 45%, respectively).
28. See Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist, supra note 22, at 125 ("[Plublic transit, even where it exists, does
not serve the reverse commuter."); John D. Kasarda, Urban Change and Minority Opportunities,in
THE NEW URBAN REALITY 33, 55 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1985).
29. See Kain, supra note 7.
30. See id. at 183-89.
31. See id. at 196. Kain attributes the reduced black employment share in neighborhoods
distant from the ghetto to several possible factors: (1) high commutation costs discourage blacks
from seeking those jobs; (2) blacks lack information about distant jobs; (3) employers outside of the
ghetto discriminate against blacks out of a fear that white customers will retaliate against them; and
(4) employers in the ghetto discriminate in favor of blacks. See id. at 179-80. Kain's methodology
has been subjected to intense scrutiny and some criticism. See, e.g., Jencks & Mayer, supra note 21,
at 187-92; Paul Offner & Daniel H. Saks, A Note on John Kain's "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization," 85 Q.J. ECON. 147, 148 (1971). In a recent article,
Kain reviews the empirical literature testing the spatial mismatch hypothesis and concludes, for the
most part, that it supports his original contentions. See John F. Kain, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Three Decades Later, 3 HousING POLICY DEBATE 371 (1992).
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residential location is a major factor in explaining ghetto poverty. Ellwood examines youth unemployment in Chicago using data from 1970
and finds that the greater distance between places of residence and jobs
for black teenagers explains only a small proportion of the blacks' poor
labor market outcomes as compared to white youths.3 2 Ellwood also
finds that black unemployment rates were similar in two Chicago neighborhoods, with widely varying levels of employment opportunities.3" He
concludes, based upon these findings, that in explaining the unemployment differentials between whites and blacks, "[r]ace, not space, remains
the key explanatory variable .... -34
Ellwood's conclusion that location does not explain much of the employment problem of black youths has come under significant criticism. 35

Several economists using more recent data have found that the residential location of the ghetto poor reduces their likelihood of being employed. 36 Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist's examination of 1980 data on youth
employment in Chicago, Los Angeles and Philadelphia shows that proximity to employment has a strong effect on the probability that young
men and women will have a job. Proximity to employment explained
between one-third and one-half of the racial gap in unemployment rates
between blacks and whites in the sample. 37 Using 1974 and 1980 employment data for Chicago and Los Angeles, Leonard reaches the conclusion that in both cities the black share of employment drops
32. See Ellwood, supra note 20, at 164; see also Mark A. Hughes & Janice F. Madden, Residential Segregation and the Economic Status of Black Workers: New Evidence for an Old Debate, 29 J.
URB. ECON. 28, 30 (1991) ("[W]e find no evidence that residential locations of blacks provide substantial barriers to access to jobs.").
33. See Ellwood, supra note 20, at 177-80.
34. Id. at 149.
35. For methodological criticisms of Ellwood's study, see, e.g., Keith R. Ihlanfeldt & David L.
Sjoquist, Job Accessibility and Racial Differences in Youth Employment Rates, 80 AM. EON. REV.
267, 274 (1990); Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition,supra note 22, at 38-39; Jonathan S.Leonard,
Comment, in THE BLACK YOUTH EMPLOYMENT CRISIS 185, 186-89 (Richard B. Freeman & Harry
J. Holzer eds., 1986); William J. Wilson, Public Policy Research and "The Truly Disadvantaged",in
THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 460, 465 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) [hereinafter

Public Policy Research].
36. Ellwood has stated that recent demographic changes lead him to believe that inner city
residential location is an important factor in explaining ghetto poverty. See Roberto Suro, Where
Have All the Jobs Gone?Follow the Crab Grass, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1991, at E5 (Ellwood quoted as
saying: "I am starting to see some real disadvantages coming from the movement of jobs to the
suburbs. There is no question that in the 1980's it aggravated the problems of the poor."). However,
a recent study by Weicher finds little support for the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Weicher finds
that from 1960 to 1980 suburbanization of employment had no effect on poverty tract unemployment rates although it did have a small effect on the probability that residents of poverty tracts
would drop out of the labor force. See Weicher, supra note 12, at 100-01.
37. See Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist, supra note 35, at 268. According to the study, if a black youth in
Philadelphia moved from the least accessible area in the metropolitan area to the most accessible
area she would improve her chances of employment by 14.4% to 22.3%. See id. at 271.

DECONCENTRA TING THE INNER CITY POOR

"dramatically" as distance from the ghetto increases. 38 He concludes
that "a more plausible [explanation] is that residential segregation has
39
limited employment opportunities for blacks."
Another method economists have used to test the spatial mismatch
hypothesis is to examine whether inner city residents earn lower incomes
than similarly situated households living in other locations. In their
analysis of 1978 data from the Current Population Survey, Price and
Mills estimate that blacks who live in central cities experience a 6% wage
penalty attributable to their residential location. 4° They characterize this
effect of residential location on earnings as "small. '41 Other studies,
however, find central city residence poses more of a disadvantage in
terms of earnings. For example, Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist find that the
fraction of a metropolitan area's low-skilled jobs located in its suburbs is
significantly related to lower earnings for males of both races and white
females who live in central cities. 42 Although the magnitude of the penalty is similar for whites and blacks, the authors conclude that blacks, as
a group, are especially harmed since their residences are more concentrated in the central city. 43 Additional studies by Straszheim, 44 and
Vrooman and Greenfield 45 reach similar conclusions that inner city resi38. See Leonard, supra note 23, at 336.
39. Id. at 339. See also Katherine M. O'Regan & John M. Quigley, Labor Market Access and
Labor Market Outcomes For Urban Youth, 21 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 277, 290 (1991) (For
black center city youths, higher levels of employment concentration in the suburbs are significant in
explaining increased unemployment.). A recent study of female-headed households provided housing vouchers pursuant to the Gautreaux litigation finds that women moving to the suburbs were
14% more likely than similarly situated women moving within the city of Chicago to find employment. See James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, Employment and Earnings of Low-Income
Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 342, 350 (Christopher
Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991). For more discussion of this study see infra text accompanying notes 122-37.
40. See Richard Price & Edwin S. Mills, Race and Residence in Earnings Determination, 17 J.
URn. ECON. 1, 16 (1987). Price and Mills find that the wage penalty for being black is much
larger-15%. See id.
41. Id. at 17. In the most recent edition of his urban economics textbook, one of the authors,
however, expresses the view that the spatial mismatch of jobs and residences for inner city blacks is
an important cause of their difficulties in the labor market. See MILLS & HAMILTON, supra note 21,
at 393-96.
42. See Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist, supra note 22, at 119-20. According to the study, for males, a one
percent increase in the fraction of low-skilled jobs located in the suburbs decreases annual earnings
by $55. See id. at 120. Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist also note that high levels of employment decentralization may lead to lower housing prices thereby offsetting some of the wage penalty. Their estimates
indicate that this offset would be relatively small. See id. at 128.
43. See id. at 127.
44. See Mahlon R. Straszheim, Discrimination and the Spatial Characteristics of the Urban Labor Market for Black Workers, 7 J. URn. ECON. 119, 138 (1980) (1965 data show that, unlike whites,
low-skilled blacks earn more in suburbs than they do in central cities suggesting an excess supply of
labor in cities.).
45. See John Vrooman & Stuart Greenfield, Are Blacks Making It in the Suburbs? Some New
Evidence on Intrametropolitan Spatial Segmentation, 7 J. URB. EON. 155, 165 (1980) (1973-74 sur-
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dence generates significant wage penalties for black employees.
C.

The Effects of Living In Concentrated Ghetto Poverty

The weight of the evidence, therefore, supports the hypothesis that a
mismatch between the location of residences and employment has contributed to the increase in ghetto poverty over the past two decades. The
concentration of ghetto poverty has also been exacerbated by the exodus
of nonpoor households from these communities. Working and middle
class households left ghetto neighborhoods at a quicker pace than the
poor leaving behind communities even more socially isolated than
before.

46

In his book, The Truly Disadvantaged,47 and several recent artiWilson argues that concentrated ghetto poverty generates a wide
array of social problems that are often different in magnitude and kind
from the problems poor people face in less isolated environments. 49 According to Wilson, a poor individual is more likely to have weak labor
force attachment if he grows up and lives in an environment that lacks
employed role-models and where the people he comes into contact with
cles,48

are similarly poor and unskilled. The absence of regular employment as
vey suggests that dispersing black males to the suburbs has the potential of reducing the earnings gap
between black and white males by 40%.); see also Clifford E. Reid, Are Blacks Making It in the
Suburbs?: A Correction, 16 J. URB. ECON. 357, 357-58 (1984) (Error correction in earlier piece by
Vrooman & Greenfield shows that "central-city black males and black females suffer an occupation
and earnings disadvantage relative to their hypothetical suburban ring counterparts.") (emphasis in
original); Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Intra-Metropolitan Variation in Earnings and Labor Market Discrimination: An Econometric Analysis of the Atlanta Labor Market, 55 S. EcON. J. 123, 132-35 (1988)
(According to the 1980 census, wages for service jobs were higher outside the central city.). But see
Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 39, at 350-51 (After controlling for other factors, Gautreaux demonstration participants who moved to the suburbs did not earn higher hourly wages than movers
within the city.).
46. See Jargowsky & Bane, supra note 10, at 266; Kathryn P. Nelson, Racial Segregation, Mobility, and Poverty Concentration (Mar. 22, 1991) (unpublished paper presented to the Annual
Meeting of the Population Association of America in Washington, D.C., on file with the ChicagoKent Law Review). Although ghetto neighborhoods existing in 1970 lost population over the succeeding decade, the aggregate level of concentrated ghetto poverty increased because the ghetto expanded into contiguous tracts. See Jargowsky & Bane, supra note 10, at 266.
47. WILSON, supra note 9.
48. See, e.g., Loifc J.D. Wacquant & William J. Wilson, The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion
in the Inner City, 501 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 8 (1989); Wilson, Public Policy Research, supra note 35; William J. Wilson, Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations: The Challenge of
Public Agenda Research, 56 AM. Soc. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Inner-City Social Dislocations].
49. The negative effects of geographic concentration on poor people were also observed by some
perceptive academics and policymakers decades ago. See, e.g., CHARLES M. HAAR & DEMETRIUS
S. IATRIDIS, HOUSING THE POOR IN SUBURBIA: PUBLIC POLICY AT THE GRASS ROOTS 15 (1974)
("[I]t is almost impossible to deal effectively with the accumulated ill effects of deprivation and deeprooted poverty when the victims are concentrated geographically. The resultant social and psychological demoralization often becomes self-reinforcing and produces a feedback reaction that hardly
can be controlled, let alone eliminated.").
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an anchor leaves the rest of the person's life "incoherent" and reduces his
perceived "self-efficacy." 5 0 Lacking employment opportunities, ghetto
residents frequently turn to deviant or illegal activities to earn income,
thereby further weakening their attachment to the labor market and middle class norms. 51 These feelings, beliefs and behaviors are then reinforced by people in the community who share similar views. The
"concentration effects" 5 2 generated by living in ghetto poverty lead Wilson to conclude, "[t]he issue is not simply that the underclass or ghetto
poor have a marginal position in the labor market similar to that of other
disadvantaged groups, it is also that their economic position is uniquely
reinforced by their social milieu."'5 3 Concentration effects may feed upon
themselves; as communities become increasingly populated by unskilled
residents who engage in deviant or illegal behaviors, firms may relocate
elsewhere so as to gain access to a more appropriate pool of labor and
54
escape negative externalities.
Recent sociological evidence seems to provide some support for Wilson's hypothesis that residence in a concentrated poverty neighborhood
has an effect on poor people independent from the effect of their own low
personal income. 5 Most social scientists agree that high rates of teenage
pregnancy among the ghetto poor generate or exacerbate social problems
ranging from dropping out of school and unemployment to low birth
weights and other medical complications.5 6 Several studies indicate that
50. See Wilson, Inner-City Social Dislocations,supra note 48, at 10-11. In addition, social isolation may deprive inner city residents of information about the existence of employment opportunities. See O'Regan & Quigley, supra note 39, at 290 (Higher social isolation is significant in
explaining unemployment among black youths.).
51. See Wilson, Public Policy Research, supra note 35, at 472.
52. See Wilson, Inner-City Social Dislocations,supra note 48, at 11.
53. Id. at 12.
54. See Kasarda, Urban Underclass Growth, supra note 25, at 259. Thus the relationship between the spatial mismatch of jobs and residences and the problems of concentrated inner city poverty is not uni-directional, but interactive.
55. Earlier research, primarily studies examining the effect of mean school socio-economic or
racial status on drop-out rates and achievement levels of poor and minority students, demonstrated
conflicting results. See Christopher Jencks & Susan E. Mayer, The Social Consequences of Growing
Up in a Poor Neighborhood, in INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 111, 173-75 (Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. & Michael G.H. McGeary eds., 1990). The authors speculate that better data
would support the conclusion that advantaged classmates encourage both poor and rich students to
learn more in elementary school, complete high school and delay sexual intercourse. See id. at 177.
Most research with respect to the concentration effects hypothesis examines black youths. Recent
studies indicate that certain of the negative effects of concentrated poverty are also experienced by
some elements of the nation's Hispanic population, particularly in northern and midwestern cities.
See Joan Moore, Is There a Hispanic Underclass?, 70 Soc. Sci. Q. 265, 271-75 (1989).
56. See, e.g., MARIAN W. EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AN AGENDA FOR SOCIAL CHANGE
51-57 (1987); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY 526 (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989); Dennis P. Hogan and Evelyn
Kitagawa, The Impact of Social Status, Family Structure and Neighborhood on the Fertility of Black
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the concentration effects of ghetto poverty contribute to the high rates of
teenage pregnancy among inner city residents. 57 Anderson's ethnographic account of black teenagers in the ghetto describes a community
of limited hope and opportunity. The street culture supports early sexual
activity, drug use and other forms of delinquency. 58 Teenagers, many of
whom are cut off from the world of the middle class and middle classoriented paths of mobility, seek to gain status from their peer groups.
For young males, sexual conquest brings pride and admiration.5 9 For
young women, the street culture "presents early sexual experience and
promiscuity as a virtue. For many such girls who have few other perceivable options, motherhood, accidental or otherwise, becomes a right
of passage to adulthood." 60 Teenagers who do not become pregnant are
frequently denigrated by other young people in the neighborhood. 6' Anderson concludes that for young women who walk the "social tightrope"
between "decency" and social acceptability, "proximity to and degree of
integration with certain peer groups can be a significant factor in the
chances of a young woman's becoming pregnant .... ,,62
Anderson's observation that concentrated ghetto poverty influences
teenage pregnancy is supported by Crane's investigation of the relationship between community socioeconomic status and the likelihood that a
teenager would become pregnant. 6 3 He finds that a drop in the proportion of people employed in a neighborhood in professional or managerial
jobs is associated with large and non-linear increases in the probability
Adolescents, 90 AM. J. Soc. 825, 828-29 (1985). But cf Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound, 1989 Wis.
L. REV. 539, 572-73 (1989) (arguing against negative stereotype of unwed, black mothers).
57. Murray, however, contends that the increased number of unmarried mothers is attributable
to incentives built into social welfare programs. See MURRAY, supra note 20, at 161-62. Social
scientists, however, have cast doubt on Murray's thesis by showing that variations in public assistance levels across states and over time within states have had little or no effect on the prevalence of
unmarried mothers. See, e.g., Mary J. Bane & David T. Ellwood, The Impact of AFDC On Family
Structure and Living Arrangements, 7 RESEARCH LAB. EcON. 137, 142 (1985); Greg J. Duncan &
Saul D. Hoffman, Welfare Benefits, Economic Opportunities, and Out-of-Wedlock Births Among
Black Teenage Girls, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 519, 530 (1990); Ellwood & Summers, supra note 20, at 6869; Greenstein, supra note 20, at 16; Sara McLanahan et al., Family Structure, Poverty, and the
Underclass,in URBAN CHANGE AND POVERTY 102, 105-09 (Michael G.H. McGeary & Laurence E.
Lynn, Jr. eds., 1988).
58. See Elijah Anderson, Neighborhood Effects on Teenage Pregnancy,in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 375, 375 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
59. See Elijah Anderson, Sex Codes and Family Life Among Poor Inner-City Youths, 59 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCl. 61-62 (1989).
60. See Anderson, supra note 58, at 380, 383. According to Anderson, many of these communities are so devoid of working or middle class role models, that the pregnant single mother, in effect,
becomes their role model. See id. at 389.
61. See id. at 391.
62. Id. at 388.
63. See Jonathan Crane, The Epidemic Theory of Ghettos and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping
Out and Teenage Childbearing, 96 AM. J. Soc. 1226 (1991).
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that black teenage female residents would become pregnant. As the proportion of people in her neighborhood employed in high status occupations drops from 31.2% to 6.0%, the probability of a black teenager
living in a large city becoming pregnant increases from 7% to 12%. 64 A
further drop in the proportion of residents employed as professionals or
managers to 3.5% causes the probability of having a child to jump from
12% to 20%.65 Crane's finding that the rate of teenage pregnancy increases at an increasing rate as high status jobs decrease supports
Wilson's hypothesis that concentration of ghetto poverty has an indepen66
dently negative effect on social outcomes.
A further test of the concentration effects hypothesis by Crane examines drop-out rates for high school students. Crane finds similar large
and non-linear changes in drop-out rates as the proportion of high status
jobs among community residents decreases. For a black child, as the
proportion of people employed as professionals or managers in one's
neighborhoods drops from 20.7% to 5.6% and 3.6%, the likelihood that
he or she will drop out of school jumps from 11% to 12% and 19%,
respectively. 67 Mayer's study of the relationship between high school socioeconomic composition and the probability that students in grades 10
to 12 will drop out adds further support to the concentration effects hypothesis. She finds that students who attend schools with a student body
composed of children who have high socioeconomic status have significantly lower drop-out rates than students of similar races and backgrounds who attend lower status schools. 6 8
64. See id. at 1240.
65. Id. For black teenagers in all locations the probability of becoming pregnant increased
from 8% to 12% to 16%. Crane also found that neighborhood effects also increased the probability
of a white teenager having a child. See id. at 1239.
66. "The nonlinear results suggest that neighborhood effects were a product of social interaction, that the whole was greater than the sum of its parts, at least in the worst neighborhoods." Id.
at 1241. See also Susan E. Mayer, How Much Does a High School's Racial and Socioeconomic Mix
Affect Graduation and Teenage Fertility Rates, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 321, 327 (Christopher
Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (Students who attend high socioeconomic status schools are
less likely to have a child than students of the same race and socioeconomic background who attend
lower status schools.).
67. See Crane, supra note 63, at 1236. "[T]he neighborhood effect among the very worst neighborhoods is more than 50 times greater than the effect in the middle." Id. Although smaller in
magnitude, the probability of dropping out for whites also increased in a non-linear fashion. See id.
at 1237.
68. See Mayer, supra note 66, at 327. A recent examination of households in Boston also supports the existence of neighborhood effects. See Paul Osterman, Welfare Participation in a Full
Employment Economy: The Impact of Neighborhood, 38 Soc. PROB. 475 (1991). The author of this
study found that after controlling for individual attributes, as the proportion of a neighborhood's
population with jobs decreases, the likelihood that an individual will receive public assistance increases. Id. at 486.
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DECONCENTRATING THE GHETrO POOR

Since Kain sparked the debate over the spatial mismatch hypothesis
in 1968, academics, lawyers and policymakers have proposed numerous
strategies to alleviate the problem of concentrated ghetto poverty. One
set of proposals advocates bringing jobs closer to people by promoting
ghetto economic development. Another approach favors bringing people
closer to jobs either by dispersing ghetto populations or facilitating their
access through improved transportation and information networks. In
this part, I briefly examine ghetto enrichment and conclude that it is
unlikely to be effective in alleviating the spatial mismatch of people and
jobs. I then examine, in greater detail, some of the opportunities and
pitfalls of deconcentration. Despite reservations over its political expediency and economic efficiency, I conclude that deconcentration efforts offer the best hope of effectively improving the spatial mismatch of jobs
and residences as well as alleviating the social problems attributable to
concentrated inner city poverty.
A.

Ghetto Enrichment

Advocates of ghetto enrichment promote public sector efforts to alleviate the spatial mismatch of jobs and residences by supporting economic development in inner city communities. Federal, state and local
governments have used a number of different mechanisms over the past
four decades to stimulate inner city economic growth. Indeed, the response of politicians of both major political parties to the recent riots in
Los Angeles has been to encourage the adoption of enrichment strategies
such as enterprise zones and low income home ownership. 69 Nevertheless, much doubt remains over whether public sector efforts to promote
economic development are feasible and efficient. One of the earliest strategies is subsidized site assembly. Beginning in the 1940s, the federal government's Urban Renewal Program subsidized the condemnation by
local governments of slum properties that were then sold to private entrepreneurs at deep discounts. 70 The record of Urban Renewal and more
recent efforts to subsidize land assembly and site preparation is not impressive. The numbers of jobs created and the amount of private sector
investment generated by the program were below the hopes and expecta69. See Ronald Brownstein, After the Riots: The Search for Answers, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1992,
at A2 (observing that President Bush and his Democratic rival, Bill Clinton, agree "to a surprising
extent" on urban policies). For a critique of low income homeownership programs see Michael H.
Schill, Privatizing FederalLow Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 916-28 (1990).

70. HOUSING AcT OF 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, §§ 101-10, 63 Stat. 413, 414 (1950).

DECONCENTRA TING THE INNER CITY POOR

tions of its proponents. 71 Furthermore, the human toll caused by displacement and the destabilization of nearby residential communities
casts doubt upon the efficacy of subsidized site assembly as an anti-pov72
erty program.
The end of the Urban Renewal Program and shrinking federal intergovernmental subsidies have left state and local governments the major
players in urban economic development. 73 States and municipalities offer
firms a wide variety of inducements to locate within their borders including tax abatements and exemptions, subsidized loans and industrial revenue bonds. Thus far, the prevailing view among economists is that these
74
tax and fiscal inducements have little effect on firm location decisions.
71. See

MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN

1949-1962, at 221-22 (1964) (Half of new construction built on Urban Renewal sites
would have been built anyway and the magnitude of private investment was relatively small.); JOHN
C. WEICHER, URBAN RENEWAL: NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR LOCAL PROBLEMS 67-68 (1972) (Government intervention may not be necessary to encourage private redevelopment.); Edwin S. Mills,
Non-Urban Policies as Urban Policies, 24 URB. STUD. 561, 566 (1987) ("There is no direct evidence
that renewal programs have stimulated employment other than that which they subsidized on renewal sites."); Roger W. Schmenner, IndustrialLocation and Urban Public Management, in THE
PROSPECTIVE CITY 446, 464 (Arthur P. Solomon ed., 1980) (Site clearance and preparation programs frequently encounter difficulty in acquiring the types of industry hoped for.). But see Robert
P. Grosberg, Urban Renewal Realistically Reappraised, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND
THE CONTROVERSY 509, 521 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966) (For every $1 of federal money expended,
$4 to $6 dollars of private construction occurred.).
72. See Herbert J. Gans, The Failureof Urban Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD
AND THE CONTROVERSY 537, 537-56 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966) (describing social problems created by Urban Renewal Program in Boston); Chester Hartman, The Housing of Relocated Families,
30 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 266, 266-86 (1964) (discussing displacement of families).
73. Since the early 1980s, Secretary of HUD Jack Kemp has promoted the idea of enterprise
zones. Depressed areas within cities would be designated enterprise zones and firms located within
these zones would be entitled to an array of tax incentives and the reduction of regulatory barriers.
Although the concept of enterprise zones has, to date, not been fully implemented by the Congress,
many states have created enterprise zones within their borders. To date, research on the effectiveness of this economic development tool is mixed. Compare U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
ENTERPRISE ZONES: LESSONS FROM THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE (1988) (Maryland enterprise
zone incentives did not cause increase in job creation.) and Richard C. Elling & Ann W. Sheldon,
Determinants of Enterprise Zone Success: A Four State Perspective, in ENTERPRISE ZONES: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 136, 150 (Roy E. Green ed., 1991) (47 enterprise zones
in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky and Ohio experienced "only modest success.") with Marilyn M.
Rubin, Urban Enterprise Zones in New Jersey: Have They Made A Difference?, in ENTERPRISE
ZONES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 105, 118 (Roy E. Green ed., 1991) (New
Jersey enterprise zone program is a cost-effective economic development tool.).
74. See Willaim F. Fox & Matthew N. Murray, The Effects of Local Government Public Policies
on the Location of Business Activity, in INDUSTRY, LOCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 97, 117 (Warren
W. Herzog, Jr. & Alan M. Schlottman eds., 1991) ("[Tlhe influence of any single local-government
policy on the start-up or location of firms is, in general, very small in any given year."); Susan S.
Jacobs & Michael Wasylenko, Government Policy to Stimulate Economic Development: Enterprise
Zones, in FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 1980s 175, 176 (Norman Walzer &
David L. Chicoine eds., 1981) ("[T]he consensus is that local tax differentials have, at best, a secondary influence on business location decisions."); Dennis W. Carlton, The Location and Employment
Choices of New Firms:An Econometric Model With Discrete and Continuous Endogenous Variables,
65 REV. ECON. & STAT. 440, 447 (1983) (Study shows that tax variables are not significantly related
to business location.); Schmenner, supra note 7 1, at 461 (Survey of firms in Cincinnati metropolitan
RENEWAL,
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The major reason for this small impact appears to be the much greater
weight firms place on other locational considerations-the availability of
expansion space, a capable workforce and access to markets-factors for
which cities no longer seem to have a comparative advantage. 75 Another
reason for the limited usefulness of economic development incentives is
their ubiquity. Since many jurisdictions offer these benefits they cease to
generate an advantage for any particular locale. 76 In addition to tax and
fiscal incentives available to all firms, government subsidies have been
targeted to minority entrepreneurs. These "black capitalism" programs
also, for the most part, have been unsuccessful; subsidized loans extended
to minority businessmen in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in high levels of
77
loan defaults and business failures.
Strong market forces have caused industries to leave the city for
suburban and offshore sites. The instruments that municipalities have to
counteract these forces are both extremely expensive and of limited effectiveness. In addition, at a macroeconomic level, urban redevelopment
may well be inefficient. In the seemingly unlikely event that the incentives offered by states and local governments would be sufficient to affect
a substantial number of firms' locational decisions, there would be a risk
78
that the resulting allocation of resources would be sub-optimal.
Whether this waste of resources would be justified on distributional
79
grounds no doubt depends upon its magnitude.
area and New England indicates that tax incentives were of little importance in firm location decisions.); Michael J. Wolkoff, Chasing a Dream: The Use of Tax Abatements to Spur Economic Development, 22 URB. STUDIES 305, 311 (1985) (Study of Detroit firms shows that property tax
abatements are unlikely to have a major impact on capital investment.). But see Alberta H. Charney,
IntraurbanManufacturing Location Decisions and Local Tax Differentials, 14 J. URa. ECON. 184,
202 (1983) (Property tax rates are significantly related to location decisions of manufacturing firms.);
William F. Fox, Fiscal Differences and Industrial Location: Some Empirical Evidence, 18 URa.
STUDIES 105, 109 (1981) (Study of firms in Cuyahoga County, Ohio shows that property tax and
fiscal variables are significant determinants of business location.).
75. See Jacobs & Wasylenko, supra note 74, at 187 (labor supply and external economies important factors); Schmenner, supra note 71, at 457 (space needs are extremely important); Wolkoff,
supra note 74, at 306 (input and output markets).
76. See Franklin J. James, Urban Economic Development: A Zero-Sum Game?, in URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 157, 161 (Richard D. Bingham & John P. Blair eds., 1984) ("There is no
convincing empirical evidence that urban economic development as currently practiced is more than

a zero sum game.").
77.

See TIMOTHY BATES & WILLIAM BRADFORD, FINANCING BLACK ECONOMIC DEVELOP-

MENT (1979); BENNETr HARRISON, URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: SUBURBANIZATION, MINORITY OPPORTUNITY, AND THE CONDITION OF THE CENTRAL CITY 165, 165-66 (1974) (Loss rate

on government loans to ghetto businesses is 38% on direct loans and 20% on loans with bank
participation.). Although Harrison views black capitalism programs as unsuccessful, he sees hope in
collective approaches to development such as community development corporations. See HARRISON, supra, at 168-84.

78. See James, supra note 76, at 158.
79. The distributional effects of incentives to lure industry to the inner city are not clear. There
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B.

Opening Up The Suburbs and the Economics of Deconcentration

Since the late 1960s, commentators have argued that the infeasibility
and inefficiency of ghetto enrichment programs dictate that a solution to
the spatial mismatch of jobs and residences involve the migration of the
ghetto poor to the suburbs. 80 Closer proximity to employment opportunities should facilitate the flow of information regarding job openings. In
addition, access to jobs would be facilitated by the reduction of the dis81
tance between place of residence and employment.
Of equal benefit is the effect that deconcentrating the ghetto would
have on future generations. Removing the young from the ghetto would
remove them from the harmful effects of concentrated poverty.8 2 Children would no longer be forced to live in environments bereft of middle
class influences and role models, where they are tempted to engage in
unproductive, deviant or criminal behavior by the influence of peer
groups. They would be educated among classmates who are not all poor,
in settings where educational achievement is measured by earning good
grades rather than by safely negotiating the dangerous streets on their
way to school.
However, substantial impediments exist to deconcentrating the
ghetto. At present, most suburbs contain relatively little housing that
would be affordable to low income households. Regulatory barriers imposed by many suburbs constitute one of the chief reasons for the absence
of low cost housing.8 3 Many suburbs impose an array of land use regulations that have the effect of raising the cost of housing beyond the reach
of low and moderate income households. In the short term, deregulation, alone, might not result in substantial deconcentration of the inner
city poor to suburban locations. Relaxed land use restrictions would
likely permit the conversion of a portion of the existing single family
housing stock into multifamily units affordable to low and moderate income households. However, even if most regulatory barriers to housing
construction were to vanish, rents of newly constructed housing in the
is no guarantee that inner city employers will hire ghetto residents instead of suburban commuters to
fill the jobs created.
80. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN

STRATEGY FOR

AMERICA (1973); John F. Kain & Joseph J. Persky, Alternatives to the Gilded Ghetto, 14 PUB. INTEREST 74 (1969).

81. Suburban residents without cars may continue to have difficulty reaching places of employment because of inadequate intra- and inter-suburban transportation networks. Nevertheless, since
the distance between employment and residence would have been decreased by suburban residence,
it is likely that the cost of remedying the transportation deficiency would likewise be reduced. See
DOWNS, supra note 80, at 28.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 46-68.
83. For a description of these regulatory barriers see infra text accompanying note 85.
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suburbs would probably outstrip the resources of poor families. Initially,
housing subsidies would be required for many of these households.
In the long term, if regulatory barriers to housing construction were
eliminated, deconcentration would be much less expensive as filtering occurred.8 4 Although developers would probably not build new, unsubsidized housing with rents affordable to low income households, they
would construct apartments for moderate and middle income families.
As time passed, residents of these units would move to newer and more
desirable accommodations, and the apartments they formerly occupied
would filter down to lower income households. Much as it has for the
urban poor, increased quantities of newly constructed unsubsidized housing would over time reduce the cost of suburban housing.
A substantial increase in the quantity of either subsidized or unsubsidized housing cannot take place as long as suburban municipalities
maintain regulatory barriers that impede its construction. As the recent
report of the President's Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers
to Affordable Housing indicates, municipalities have enacted a large variety of land use regulations that restrict the supply of housing and drive
up the cost of new construction."5 Among the most common regulations
are large lot zoning requirements, minimum frontage rules, expensive
subdivision exactions and no-growth ordinances.
Deconcentrating the ghetto poor to suburban locations would necessitate the removal or reduction of exclusionary land use regulations.
Whether such deconcentration would promote or impede economic efficiency8 6 is an enormously complex question. In theory, exclusionary
zoning8 7 may enhance economic efficiency. One of the fundamental theorems of urban economics is that competition among jurisdictions is
likely to promote efficiency. According to Tiebout, 88 the ability of people
84. See John C. Weicher & Thomas G. Thibodeau, Filteringand Housing Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 23 J. URB. ECON. 21, 37 (1988) (Empirical test of the filtering model shows that new
construction leads to less substandard housing.).
85.

See ADVISORY COMM'N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, "NOT

IN MY BACKYARD": REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 2-1 to 2-14 (1991). For a
discussion of the Commissions's proposals see Michael H. Schill, The FederalRole in Reducing
Suburban Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing, J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 1992).
86. The criterion of economic efficiency used in this article is "Kaldor-Hicks efficiency." A
given allocation of resources is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if those made better off could compensate
those made worse off. Actual compensation need not be paid. See GEORGE W. DOWNS & PATRICK
D.

LARKEY, THE SEARCH FOR GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY 7 (1986).

87. I occasionally use the term "exclusionary zoning" to refer to land use practices whose effects are to exclude low income households from a particular jurisdiction. Whether the term takes
on a pejorative connotation depends upon the perspective of the reader.
88. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418
(1956).
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to move to different jurisdictions creates a market for public goods.
Based upon a set of "heroic" 89 assumptions, including perfect information, costless mobility and the absence of external effects, 90 Tiebout's
model maintains that citizens are consumers who choose to reside in
communities that provide their desired mix of public goods. 9 1 In effect,
the existence of decentralized local governments permits individuals to
"vote with their feet" selecting a package of taxes and services that is
more likely to reflect their preferences than any probable combination
92
offered by higher level governments.
An efficient Tiebout outcome requires that all individuals in a jurisdiction pay the same amount of taxes (head taxes) for public goods provided by the municipality. Otherwise, a deadweight loss would occur as
some individuals paid more for services than the benefits they received
while others had their consumption of public goods subsidized. Additional households would then migrate to the community to take advantage of the subsidy eventually causing residents who received less in
services than they paid in taxes to migrate elsewhere. No municipality
uses a head tax as its primary source of revenue, although as Hamilton
observes, zoning regulations can convert the main source of local tax revenue, the property tax, into a head tax. 93 Zoning regulations can effectively set a minimum value on property in a community, thereby
ensuring that no one who lives in the jurisdiction pays less in taxes than
94
his or her proportionate share of the cost of services provided.
Although suburban exclusionary zoning may have certain efficiencyenhancing properties such as facilitating a system of competing jurisdictions, it may also generate allocative inefficiencies. 95 Numerous studies
89. See Wallace E. Oates, An Economist's Perspective on Fiscal Federalism, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 3, 7 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 1977).
90. See Tiebout, supra note 88, at 419. The model also assumes that consumers can choose to
live in a large number of different communities, that their mobility is unhindered by employment
considerations, and that communities below the optimum size will seek to attract new residents
whereas communities above or at optimum size will discourage new residents. See id. at 419-20.
91. See id. at 418.
92. See id. at 418, 420.

93. See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments,
12 URB. STUDIES 205 (1975).
94. See id. at 207. See also Edwin S.Mills, Economic Analysis of Urban Land-Use Controls, in
CURRENT ISSUES IN URBAN ECONOMICS 511, 533 (Peter Mieszkowski & Mahlon Straszheim eds.,

1979). For analyses of whether zoning converts the property tax into an efficient source of revenue
compare William A. Fischel, Property Taxation and the Tiebout Model: Evidence for the Benefit
View From Zoning and Voting, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 171 (1992) with Peter Mieszkowski &
George R. Zodrow, Taxation and the Tiebout Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes
on Land Rents, and Property Taxes, 27 J. EON. LIT. 1098 (1989).
95. Needless to say, exclusionary zoning generates enormous distributional consequences that
many would find objectionable. This section, however, emphasizes the effect of restrictive land use
regulations on economic efficiency.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:795

have shown that land use regulations increase the price of housing in
suburbs. 96 Higher housing prices alone do not necessarily mean that
zoning regulations are inefficient; increased prices may be attributable to
the greater desirability of the community and its housing stock. However, if higher housing values in a community are caused by restricting
supply rather than stimulating demand the allocation of resources will be
sub-optimal. Ellickson observes that existing owners can utilize land use
regulations to obtain monopoly profits in suburbs with unique geographic or cultural features. 9 7 The existence of monopoly zoning is supported by empirical research. Studies show that metropolitan areas with
few competing jurisdictions have higher housing prices than more decentralized regions. 98 In addition, Pollakowski, Wachter and Cho's recent
studies of housing prices in two Washington, D.C. suburbs show that
zoning increases the price of housing not only in the community promulgating the ordinance, but in adjacent communities as well. 99 Fischel argues that this spillover effect provides evidence that increased prices are
attributable to supply restraints rather than increased amenities since the
°
size of the jurisdictions makes amenity spillovers unlikely. 10
In addition to the inefficiencies associated with artificial supply restrictions, restrictive suburban zoning wastes resources because of the al96. See, e.g., J. Thomas Black & James E. Hoben, Land Price Inflation and Affordable Housing:
Causes and Impacts, 6 URB. GEOGRAPHY 27, 38 (1985) (Index of regulatory restrictiveness is positively related to single family lot prices in 1980.); Laurence Katz & Kenneth T. Rosen, The Interjurisdictional Effects of Growth Controls on Housing Prices, 30 J.L. & ECON. 149, 159 (1987)
(Regression analysis indicates that house prices are between 17% and 38% higher in communities
with growth controls or moratoria.); David Segal & Philip Srinivasin, The Impact of Suburban
Growth Restrictions on U.S. Housing Price Inflation, 1975-1978, 6 URB. GEOGRAPHY 14, 23 (1985)
(Growth control ordinances are positively related to housing price inflation in sample of 51 metropolitan areas.).
97. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
YALE L.J. 385, 404, 430-31 (1977).
98. See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and the Exercise of Monopoly Power, 5 J. URH. ECON. 116,
125-28 (1978) (Study of metropolitan areas in New Jersey suggests that interurban house price variations of as much as 50% may be attributable to monopoly zoning.); Louis A. Rose, Urban Land
Supply: Natural and Contrived Restrictions, 25 J. URB. ECON. 325, 344 (Monopoly zoning may explain 40% of the interurban price differentials in 45 urban areas.). But see William A. Fischel, Zoning and the Exercise of Monopoly Power: A Reevaluation, 8 J. URB. ECON. 283, 288-290 (1979)
(Replication of Hamilton study with broader definition of zoning authorities fails to find evidence of
monopoly zoning.).
99. See Henry 0. Pollakowski & Susan M. Wachter, The Effects of Land-Use Constraints on
Housing Prices, 66 LAND ECON. 315, 323 (1990) (Montgomery County); Susan M. Wachter & Man
Cho, Interjurisdictional Price Effects Of Land Use Controls, 40 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 49, 62-63
(1991) (Fairfax County).
100. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, Do GROWTH CONTROLS MATrER? A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE REGULATION 36 (1990). Increased housing prices in jurisdictions adjacent to restrictive suburbs also raise
important distributional concerns. If the effect of restrictive suburban zoning is to raise central city
housing prices, the effect of exclusionary zoning on the poor will be magnified. In essence, they will
be forced to pay for the privilege of being excluded from the suburbs.
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ternative locations chosen by or forced upon people and firms. For those
inner city residents who are employed, artificially constrained housing
choices inhibit the ability of households to optimize the tradeoff between
housing consumption and work commutes. 0°' A large proportion of urban dwellers who might want to live in the suburbs are unable to move
there because of the increase in housing costs attributable to restrictive
land use regulations. For those with jobs in the suburbs, the inability to
move closer to work results in longer commutes and the consumption of
scarce resources. 10 2 Increased automobile usage leads to more rapid depreciation of cars, greater highway congestion and air pollution. This
pattern of inefficient spatial location may be further intensified if suburbs
use their zoning powers to exclude firms as well as residents. Zoning
restrictions against commercial and manufacturing firms could push
these enterprises further away from the centers of metropolitan areas
contributing to inefficient land use patterns, even greater distances between places of employment and residence and lost agglomeration
03
economies. 1
In like manner, the external effects of suburban land use practices on
central city residents and firms are not limited to pecuniary externalities, 1 4 but instead are likely to have a negative impact on the efficient
allocation of resources. For the ghetto poor, the inability to locate affordable housing in the suburbs contributes to the existence of concentrated poverty. As I discussed in Part I, empirical evidence supports the
proposition that geographically concentrated poverty generates social
problems among the poor that are both different in kind and of greater
magnitude than would occur in a more dispersed setting. In addition to
the enormous costs borne by ghetto residents attributable to high rates of
teenage pregnancy, school dropouts, crime and drug abuse, these concentration effects also impose costs on the entire metropolis and the nation.
101.

See Jeffrey S. Zax, Compensationfor Commutes in Labor and Housing Markets, 30 J. URB.

EcON. 203-04 (1991). Constrained housing choices may also limit the ability of households to shift
the burden of commuting expenses to employers. See id.
102. See Robert Cervero, Jobs-HousingBalancing and Regional Mobility, 55 J. AM. PLAN. ASsoc. 136, 143 (1989) (Empirical study "confirms that housing costs around Bay Area suburban
employment centers were a significant push factor in 1980, inducing many workers to live at least
four or more miles away from their workplaces.").
103. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APDavid F. Bradford & Wallace E.
Oates, Suburban Exploitation of Central Cities and Governmental Structure, in REDISTRIBUTION
THROUGH PUBLIC CHOICE 43, 54, 65-67, 84 (Harold M. Hochman & George E. Peterson eds.,
PROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 261-69 (1985);

1974).
104. For a discussion of the distinction between pecuniary and technological externalities see
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 28-32
(1975).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:795

Scarce resources must be devoted to increased police protection, remedial
education, post-natal health care and prison space. Middle and upper
income households and business firms move to locations they would
otherwise not have preferred in order to escape the social problems and
related financial burdens of the inner city. A generation of urban poor
become recipients of public assistance rather than productive members of
the workforce.
The bulk of evidence on suburban land use regulation supports the
conclusion that as currently practiced restrictive zoning is inefficient. 0 5
Nevertheless, this observation does not mean that eliminating all restrictive land use regulation would be more efficient than the status quo.
Prohibiting suburbs from using restrictive zoning altogether would probably result in substantial diseconomies due to the loss of Tiebout efficiencies. 0 6 Fortunately, deconcentration need not result in the
abandonment of all land use regulation by suburbs. Most proposals for
opening the suburbs to the poor contemplate only a modest number of
low cost housing units in each community. 0 7
An analysis of the efficiency implications of deconcentrating the
ghetto must take into account the social as well as fiscal costs such a
policy would impose on both the ghetto and suburban communities as
well as the benefits for the migrants themselves. Deconcentration would
impose two sets of costs on remaining ghetto residents. To the extent
that selective migration results in households with more resources leaving the ghetto first, the isolation that has contributed to the social
problems prevalent in these communities would be intensified. Increased
isolation of the very poor, however, need not accompany deconcentration. Housing subsidies could be targeted to very low income households. In addition, as the levels of poverty and racial concentration in
central cities decreased, it is likely that economic development and residential growth would be stimulated.' 0 8 This development would likely
105. See FISCHEL, supra note 100, at 53 ("Growth controls and other aggressive extensions of
land use regulations probably impose costs on society that are larger than the benefits they provide."). Fischel analyzes the results of a study of the Boston housing market. See FISCHEL, supra
note 103, at 243 (citing GEORGE PETERSON, THE INFLUENCE OF ZONING REGULATIONS ON LAND
AND HOUSING PRICES (Urban Institute Working Paper 1207-24, July 1974)). The study shows that
the losses suffered by the owners of undeveloped land in these communities exceeded the sum of the
gains to the community. Fischel concludes, "This study stands in my mind as convincing evidence
that conventional suburban zoning is inefficiently restrictive." Id.
106. Cf Bradford & Oates, supra note 103, at 59-64 (Uniform levels of taxation and expenditure
among municipalities in New Jersey would result in large efficiency losses.).
107. Of course, if deconcentration is to rely primarily on filtering, see supra text accompanying
note 84, the number of new housing units required would probably be larger than the target number
of low income households for any particular community.
108. Cf. Edwin S. Mills, Open Housing Laws as Stimulus to CentralCity Employment, 17 J. URB.
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enhance job opportunities for remaining households and also increase tax
revenue per capita that could be used to fund community services. 1 9
A second potential cost for remaining inner city residents is the potential loss of political power. In several large cities, blacks and other
minorities either constitute a majority or are important members of the
political coalition in power. Since the inner city poor are disproportionately composed of minorities, they would be relatively more heavily represented in deconcentration efforts than whites and might lose the
political gains they have achieved. Deconcentration, however, need not
disenfranchise black voters. Voting mechanisms that do not rely upon
geographic concentration may be used to empower dispersed minority
populations.110 In addition, even if minority communities were to lose
political power as a result of deconcentration, it is likely that the substantive gains from deconcentration would be worth the loss of influence in
the city. Merely electing mayors in Philadelphia, Detroit and Atlanta
does not seem to have materially improved the economic opportunities of
minorities in these cities. III
Proximity between predominantly black lower income households
from the inner city and middle and upper income suburbanites might
generate costs for both groups. To the extent that each group would
prefer to be separate from the other, deconcentration might decrease
overall net welfare. 1 2 Two methodological problems limit the concluECON. 184, 188 (1985) (Data suggest that facilitating black suburbanization may increase employment and residential growth in central cities.); George Palumbo et al., PopulationDecentralization
Within Metropolitan Areas: 1970-1980, 27 J. URB. ECON. 151, 162-63 (1990) (Central city employment growth rates are lower in metropolitan areas with a higher percentage of blacks in the central
cities.).
109. An increase in per capita tax revenue could take place merely as a result of the outmigration of people who do not provide net tax revenues. In addition, tax revenue could increase as higher
demand for central city land increased property values. Higher demand for central city locations
would probably result from the reduction of social problems in the center city, the decreased number
of residents requiring redistribution and increased economic activity. Increased benefits for the poor,
however, might not be provided if their reduced numbers led to disproportionately less influence
over elected officials and lower levels of benefits and taxation.
110. See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest For PoliticalEquality, 77 VA. L. REV.
1413, 1452 (1991).
111. See, e.g., ZEEV CHAFETS, DEVIL'S NIGHT AND OTHER TRUE TALES OF DETROIT (1990)
(Detroit); GARY ORFIELD & CAROLE ASHKINAZE, THE CLOSING DOOR: CONSERVATIVE POLICY
AND BLACK OPPORTUNITY (1991) (Atlanta); Mark A. Hughes, Formation of the Impacted Ghetto:

Evidence From Large Metropolitan Areas, 1970-1980, 11 URB. GEOGRAPHY 265, 279-80 (1990)
(Philadelphia). Cf Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory
ofBlack ElectoralSuccess, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1128-34 (1991) ("[B]lack electoral success alone
cannot transform the depressed political and economic state of the black community, especially
given that blacks are concentrated in politically impotent and economically isolated parts of urban
metropolitan areas where racial polarization continues.").
112. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167
(1981) (Social scientists doubt whether there are net benefits from economic integration.). For purposes of this analysis of the costs and benefits of deconcentration, I treat all preferences, including
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sions one can draw from existing empirical literature on the preferences
of households for racial integration. The primary source of information
on black and white attitudes with respect to integration are opinion
surveys. The data from these studies may be somewhat suspect since
many individuals would likely be hesitant to express prejudiced views to
a stranger. A second limitation of these studies is their failure to control
for the effects of class. Whites who express an aversion to living in close
proximity to blacks may be using race as a proxy for economic status.
Therefore it is unclear whether a white respondent who says that he prefers not to live near blacks is motivated solely by racist preferences or by
a desire to live in a community composed of persons of similar socioeconomic status.' 13
With these caveats in mind, evidence on whether blacks and whites
object to living in close proximity to each other is somewhat mixed.
Most studies show that large majorities of whites do not object to black
neighbors, provided that the number of blacks is limited to a modest
proportion.1 14 In one recent survey, a majority of whites expressed a
preference for neighborhoods in which they constituted at least 80% of
the population.' 15 Blacks, on the other hand, prefer integrated neighborhoods in which one half of the residents are black, the other half
white. 1 6 Despite this preference for neighborhoods with equal proportions of blacks and whites, most blacks also express a willingness to move
those for racial and economic separation, as given. Although these preferences are appropriately
considered in the context of an efficiency analysis of deconcentration, policymakers may wish to
discount or ignore these preferences on the ground that they are illegal and/or immoral. However, a
failure to consider the racial and economic preferences of whites and blacks in the context of a
deconcentration policy may result in the resegregation of poor minorities in the suburbs and the
reproduction of the problems associated with concentrated poverty. See infra text accompanying
notes 199-215.
113. It is likely that racism explains a large proportion of the preference of many whites for
racially homogenous neighborhoods. Studies show that middle income blacks encounter similar
levels of hostility as those who are poor. See Joe Darden, Choosing Neighbors and Neighborhoods:
The Role of Race in Housing Preference, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF
RACIAL SEGREGATION 15, 16-17 (Gary A. Tobin ed., 1987). A third limitation of several of these
studies is that they do not control for whether the respondent lives in a suburb or city. If one of the
motives for suburban location is racial prejudice, one might expect the reactions of suburbanites to
differ from those of city dwellers.
114. Lawrence Bobo et al., Changing Racial Attitudes toward Residential Integration, in HousING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 152, 162-63 (John M. Goering ed., 1986); W.A.V.
Clark, Residential Preferencesand Neighborhood Racial Segregation:A Test of the Schelling Segregation Model, 28 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 9-11 (1991); Reynolds Farley, Neighborhood Preferences and Aspirations Among Blacks and Whites 5-7 (May 20-21, 199 1) (unpublished paper presented at the Urban
Institute Urban Opportunity Program Conference on Housing Markets and Residential Mobility in
Airlie, Virginia, on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
115. See Clark, supra note 114, at 9.
116. See id. at 9; Farley, supra note 114, at 7; Reynolds Farley et al., "Chocolate City, Vanilla
Suburbs." Will the Trend Toward Racially Separate Communities Continue?, 7 SoC. ScI. RESEARCH
319, 328 (1978).
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to predominantly white communities as long as they would not be the
only black household in the neighborhood.' 1 7 Two studies using methodologies different from opinion poll research reach contradictory conclusions as to whether black households value living in integrated
environments. Galtster's hedonic model of house values in St. Louis
shows that black owners have an aversion to living in neighborhoods
with large black majorities. "1 8 Boehm and Ihlanfeldt's investigation of
the determinants of neighborhood satisfaction, however, indicates that
among blacks neighborhood racial composition is not a significant factor
in neighborhood evaluations. 1 19 Based upon the contradictory evidence
on white and black preferences for integration it is difficult to conclude
that deconcentration would harm either group. Indeed, the evidence
provides modest support for the proposition that as long as the number
of black individuals moving to white suburban neighborhoods is limited,
0
both whites and blacks could be made better off.12

The best evidence of the potential advantages of deconcentrating the
inner city poor to suburban locations are comparisons of the experiences
of poor surburban households to urban households. Such comparisons,
however, are confounded by the problem of selective migration. If poor
households living in the suburbs are systematically different from urban
households, a comparison of the experiences of the two groups will be
biased. 12' A recent study of participants in the Gautreaux Assisted
Housing Program, however, controls for some of the effects of selective
migration and demonstrates that the benefits of deconcentration can be
considerable. The Gautreaux Program was instituted as a result of a successful lawsuit brought by residents of public housing in Chicago. Plaintiffs challenged intentional segregation on the part of the Chicago
117. See Farley, supra note 114, at 7 (NORC survey shows that blacks preferred mostly white
neighborhoods to mostly black ones.); Reynolds Farley et al., Barriers to the Racial Integration of

Neighborhoods: The Detroit Case, 441 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 97, 106 (1979)
(Ninety-five percent of blacks would move to neighborhoods whose populations were 13% black.).
118. See George C. Galster, Black and White Preferencesfor Neighborhood Racial Composition,
10 AM. REAL ESTATE & URB. ECON. Assoc. J. 39, 59 (1982).

For neighborhoods that were

predominantly white, the effect of racial composition on house value was statistically insignificant.
See id.
119. See Thomas P. Boehm & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, The Revelation of NeighborhoodPreferences:
An N-Chotomous MultivariateProbitApproach, 1 J. HOUSING ECON. 33, 53 (1991). The authors also
found that whites who lived in neighborhoods where over 75% of their neighbors were white had
higher levels of satisfaction. Id.
120. Indeed, Downs suggested in the early 1970s that the number of low income households
moving to white suburban neighborhoods be limited so as not to raise the opposition of suburban
residents to deconcentration. See DOWNS, supra note 80, at 138-41. Federal law, however, makes it
difficult to limit the number of minorities in particular neighborhoods even when the motive behind
the "discrimination" is to promote integration. See infra text accompanying notes 200-06.
121. See Jencks & Mayer, supra note 21, at 207-08.
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Housing Authority (CHA) and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 122 In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 123 a federal appellate court ordered the CHA and HUD to
provide housing opportunities for minority public housing applicants in
non-segregated areas in Chicago as well as its suburbs.
Under the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program, applicants for
public housing are offered up to three homes in either the city or suburbs.
The homes are typically owned by private landlords and the tenants'
rents are subsidized by housing vouchers or certificates. Sociologists and
lawyers from Northwestern University have interviewed a number of
124
participants in the program to evaluate the effects of deconcentration.
Overall, the findings of these studies provide significant evidence supporting efforts to deconcentrate the inner city. One set of studies focuses on
the educational experiences of children. A comparison of youths who
had moved to the suburbs seven years earlier with those who had moved
within the city shows that the suburban residents have a much lower
school drop-out rate and significantly higher college attendance rates.
They also tend to earn higher salaries than youths who remained in the
city. 125 Mothers report that suburban schools have higher standards

than city schools although, contrary to expectations, these higher standards do not translate into lower grades for the students. 26 The Gautreaux mothers also express greater satisfaction with suburban teachers
than do mothers of children attending city schools. 12 7 Suburban participants in the Gautreaux program are more likely, however, to be placed in
special education classes than their urban counterparts. 28 They are also
more likely to experience incidents of racial discrimination. 129 Overall,
however, the levels of satisfaction of suburban mothers with respect to
their children's schools, friends and educational progress are significantly
122. For a discussion of the Gautreaux case see infra text accompanying notes 191-92.
123. 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub. nom., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
124. Since households have no control over whether they are offered housing in cities or the
suburbs, the authors believe that they have minimized the problem selective migration poses in making comparisons among urban and suburban households. See Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 39,
at 346. Nevertheless, the authors do note that participants in the program are not necessarily representative of the low income population in public housing. They generally have smaller families, good
rent-paying records and have met housekeeping standards set forth by the organization administering the program. See id. at 347.

125. See James E. Rosenbaum, Black Pioneers- Do Their Moves to the Suburbs Increase Economic Opportunity for Mothers and Children?, 2 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 1179, 1198 (1991).
126. See James E. Rosenbaum et al., White Suburban Schools' Responses to Low-income Black
Children: Sources of Successes and Problems, 20 URB. REv. 28, 30, 39 (1988).
127. See id. at 36.
128. Nineteen percent of the suburban children were placed in special education classes compared to 4.9% of the urban children studied. See id. at 33.
129. See id. at 38.
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higher than for the group of mothers who moved within the city.' 30
A recent examination of the employment experience of Gautreaux
mothers shows that women who moved to the suburbs were 14% more
likely to be employed than those who remained in the city. 13' No significant difference, however, was found in the level of hourly wages between
the two groups. 132 Two studies of neighborhood satisfaction provide further support for the proposition that deconcentration generates significant benefits for the Gautreaux households. Suburban movers are more
satisfied with neighborhood safety, police protection and schools than are
those who remained in the city. 1 33 They are less satisfied, however, with
public transportation and medical care.1 34 In terms of social integration
within their neighborhoods, the results are generally, but not uniformly,
positive. Suburban movers interact with their neighbors more than city
movers do and have a greater number of interracial friendships. 135 Children are as well integrated into their communities as their counterparts
in the city. 136 Nevertheless, a significant proportion of the suburban
movers have at one time since the move felt isolated and experienced
discrimination. These negative experiences, however, have improved
137
with the passage of time.
C.

NeighborhoodSatisfaction Of Poor People in Cities and Suburbs

Despite their obvious relevance to the question of whether deconcentration generates significant benefits, the Gautreaux studies are the
130. James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, Economic and Social Impacts of Housing Integration 25 (Mar. 1990) (unpublished report to the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, on file with the
Chicago-Kent Law Review).
131. See Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 39, at 350-51. Among women who had never been
employed before, suburban women were 16% more likely to find jobs. Based upon their interviews
with the women, the researchers conclude that the main reasons for the greater probability of employment in the suburbs were increased safety in the community permitting the mothers to leave
their children in school without being nearby, more job opportunities in the suburbs and a greater
level of self esteem and motivation among the women themselves. See id. at 352. The authors do
note that some women felt that their employment prospects were harmed by the lack of public
transportation, discrimination and the high level of skills required by suburban employers. See id. at
353. See also James E. Rosenbaum et al., Social Integration of Low-Income Black Adults in MiddleClass White Suburbs, 38 Soc. PRoH. 448, 455 (1991) (same).
132. See Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 39, at 350.
133. See Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 130, at 21; Rosenbaum et al., Low-Income Black
Children in White Suburban Schools 151 (1986) (unpublished report to the Spencer Foundation of
Chicago, on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
134. See Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 130, at 21. Suburban residents found hospitals and
doctors less willing to accept Medicaid than urban health care providers. See id.
135. Rosenbaum et al., supra note 133, at 150, 153.
136. See id. at 152.
137. See Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 130, at 20; see also Rosenbaum et al., supra note 131,
at 455 (same).
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only recent attempts by social scientists to compare neighborhood conditions of poor city dwellers and suburbanites. In this section, I use data
from the 1987 American Housing Survey (AHS) to evaluate the neighborhood and housing circumstances of poor households in central cities
138
and suburbs.
The AHS is a biennial survey of close to 50,000 households randomly selected throughout the nation by the Census Bureau. 139 Among
the advantages of the AHS over the decennial census are its greater frequency and a much more detailed set of questions concerning housing
and neighborhood characteristics. To examine the neighborhood and
housing conditions of urban and suburban poor households, all respondents living outside of metropolitan areas were excluded from the sample. From the remaining 30,413 respondents, those with family
incomes 4Obelow the poverty level for 1987 were selected for study. The
size of this sub-sample is 3,484 respondents; 1,945 live in central cities,
14 t
the remainder in suburbs.
Table 1 compares selected personal and housing characteristics for
urban and suburban households with appropriate breakdowns by race. 14 2
In terms of marital status, more single poor households live in the suburbs than in the city. Nevertheless, for the entire sample of poor households, the proportion of households headed by a single mother is greater
in the central city than in the suburbs. White households in central cities
are significantly better educated than their suburban counterparts. For
blacks and Hispanics, however, the differences in education are not statistically significant.
As might be expected, the proportion of poor households that own
138. The data used is from the American Housing Survey, 1987: National Core File.
139. The AHS is conducted by the Census Bureau under a contract with HUD. The Census
Bureau and HUD also collaborate on an annual survey of metropolitan areas. Every four years
samples of between 3,000 and 5,000 households are interviewed in 44 metropolitan areas. The questionnaire administered for the metropolitan samples is similar to the one used for the national sample. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, American Housing Survey for the

United States in 1987, vii-xiv (1989).
140. Income includes cash transfer payments but does not include the value of in-kind subsidies
such as food stamps. It is likely that the respondents understate their actual income. See id. (Errata
to page 10).
141. Of the respondents below the poverty level living in central cities, 948 were white and 739
were black; with respect to the suburbs, 1,228 of the poor respondents were white and 184 were
black. The American Housing Survey weights the responses to the survey to adjust for non-response. The adjusted data is used in the frequency, regression and probit analyses. For a discussion
of the weighting procedure see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 139,

at app. 57 to app. 58.
142. The only racial or ethnic breakdowns are for whites, blacks and Hispanics. Although the
AHS also identifies Asians and American-Indians, the numbers of respondents in these categories is
too small for meaningful statistical analyses. All races and ethnicities, however, are included in the
"All Races" category.
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homes is significantly greater in the suburbs than in the central cities.
Households living in the city also seem to have higher housing cost burdens than do suburban households. The proportion of households paying less than 30% of their reported income for housing-related expenses
is greater in the suburbs whereas the proportion paying in excess of 50%
of income is higher for those who live in the central cities. As one might
expect with poor households, the proportion of income devoted to housing expenses is rather high. Close to two-thirds of all households pay in
excess of 50% of their reported income on housing.
With respect to the condition of their housing, a greater proportion
of city residents rated their homes unfavorably as compared to suburban
households. 4 3 Similarly, a larger proportion of urban dwellings were
rated structurally inadequate by the Census Bureau interviewers.' "
Among blacks, however, the proportion of homes that were classified as
structurally inadequate is significantly greater in the suburbs than the
central city.
Table 2 compares the neighborhood conditions of poor households
in cities and suburbs. The first impression one gets from the data is the
rather high levels of neighborhood satisfaction expressed by households
in both urban and suburban settings. When asked to evaluate their
neighborhoods, 62.8% of the urban residents gave favorable ratings;
among suburbanites the proportion exceeds three-quarters.' 45 As the
overall neighborhood evaluation indicates, suburban neighborhoods are
rated higher than urban neighborhoods: 16.3% of urban households gave
their neighborhoods unfavorable ratings compared to only 9% of the
suburban respondents. When asked what neighborhood problems bothered them, a greater proportion of urban dwellers mentioned crime, litter, bad public services and bad people in the community.
For advocates of deconcentration, however, the neighborhood evaluation data reveal potentially troubling conditions when race is taken
into account. Comparing both white and Hispanic households in the
suburbs to those living in cities, a significantly greater proportion of the
suburban residents express favorable neighborhood evaluations and a
143. The question on housing quality asked the households to rate their homes as a place to live
on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being the lowest rating and 10 being the highest. I collapsed the responses into three categories for the frequency analysis: Unfavorable (1-4), Neutral (5-6), and
Favorable (7-10).
144. A structurally inadequate dwelling is defined as having one of a list of enumerated problems
concerning plumbing, heating, upkeep, hallways or kitchens. For a full definition of structural inadequacy, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 139, at app. 15.
145. The overall neighborhood quality rating question has the same structure as the housing
quality rating item. The scale was collapsed into similar categories for the frequency analysis. See
supra note 143.
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smaller proportion have problems with crime, litter and bad people. For
blacks, however, the difference in neighborhood evaluation between city
and suburban households is statistically insignificant. Only with respect
to crime does a significant difference emerge in favor of the suburbs. If
black households are no better off in the suburbs than they are in the
cities, one of the principal justifications for deconcentration evaporates.
The apparently different reactions of white and Hispanic households, on the one hand, and black households, on the other, to suburban
neighborhoods may be caused by the limited control variables (race,
place of residence and poverty status) introduced into the frequency analysis. A more complete analysis would utilize multivariate techniques to
control for the effects of a series of personal characteristics as well. Controlling for personal and family characteristics would also help filter out
some of the bias attributable to selective migration. 146 Therefore four
models are presented in which neighborhood satisfaction is hypothesized
to be a function of variables that include the respondent's personal characteristics and place of residence. 147 Studies demonstrate that personal
characteristics are significantly related to neighborhood and residential
satisfaction. 148 The personal characteristics that I control for in each
of the four models are income (INCOME), tenure (RENT), 1 49 race

(BLACK, HISPANIC), geographic region (NE, SOUTH, WEST), level
of education (EDO, ED2, ED3),IS ° availability of a car or truck
146. Of course, the results of this analysis may still be biased because of an inability to control
for all relevant differences among the two groups. As expected in research of this type, the Adjusted
R-Squared is unfortunately very low, 0.10, meaning that the regression models account for only 10%
of the variance in the dependent variable.
147. Subjective evaluations of neighborhood quality may be criticized on the ground that individuals are not truly aware of their feelings, are subject to cognitive dissonance or are unable to make
distinctions among categories in a ten level scale. Nevertheless, objective indicators of neighborhood
quality are difficult to devise and it is unclear that any particular metric chosen by the researcher
would be salient to the person whose views are being canvassed. I prefer to rely on the stated views
of the survey respondents rather than second guessing their validity or devising a scale that may have
little relevance to them. For a discussion of the appropriateness of subjective indicators of neighborhood quality see MICHAEL H. SCHILL & RICHARD P. NATHAN, REVITALIZING AMERICA'S CITIES:
NEIGHBORHOOD REINVESTMENT AND DISPLACEMENT 70 (1983).
148. See, e.g., Sue Weidemann & James R. Anderson, A Conceptual Framework for Residential
Satisfaction, in HOME ENVIRONMENTS 153, 161-62 (Irwin Altman & Carol M. Werner eds., 1985);
Christine C. Cook, Components of NeighborhoodSatisfaction: Responsesfrom Urban and Suburban
Single-Parent Women, 20 ENVIR. & BEHAVIOR 115, 136-37 (1988); George C. Galster, Identifying
the Correlates of Dwelling Satisfaction: An Empirical Critique, 19 ENVIR. & BEHAVIOR 539, 555
(1987); George C. Galster & Garry W. Hesser, ResidentialSatisfaction: Compositional and Contextual Correlates, 13 ENVIR. & BEHAVIOR 735, 747 (1981); Barrett A. Lee & Avery M. Guest, Determinants of Neighborhood Satisfaction:A Metropolitan-Level Analysis, 24 Soc. Q. 287, 299 (1983);
Craig St. John & Frieda Clark, Racial Differences in Dimensions of Neighborhood Satisfaction, 15
SOC. INDICATORS RES. 43, 53-54 (1984).
149. RENT is a dummy variable. It takes on the value of "0" if the respondent is an owner; "1"
if he rents.
150. EDO is a dummy variable that takes on the value of "I" if the respondent has not graduated
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(CAR), 15

age

(AGE),

family

structure

(SINGLE,

SINGMOM,

KIDS) 15 2 and number of years at the same address (TENYRS). To test
for non-linear effects of certain continuous variables, I also control for
the squared values of income, age and number of years at the same address (INCOMESQ, AGESQ, TENYRSQ). In two of the four models
(Models 2 and 4), I control for whether the respondent lives in public
housing (PROJECTS).
The independent variable of particular interest is whether the respondent lives in a suburb or central city. In two of the models (Models
1 and 2), the dummy variable SUBDUM takes on the value of "0" if the
respondent lives in a city and "1" if he lives in a suburb. To test whether
urban/suburban location has a differential effect on the neighborhood
satisfaction of poor whites, blacks and Hispanics, in Models 3 and 4 I
interact the SUBDUM variable with the race of the respondent
(WHSUBDUM, BLSUBDUM and HISUBDUM). If suburban residence is related to higher levels of neighborhood satisfaction, the SUBDUM variable(s) should take on positive values.
Table 3 contains the estimated coefficients for each of the independent variables computed using ordinary least squares (OLS). There is
some question as to whether OLS is an appropriate method for analyzing
data such as the AHS neighborhood evaluation scale which are not,
strictly speaking, interval level data. 153 Nevertheless, most studies analyzing similar scales use parametric statistics 54 and several econometric
studies indicate that the violation of the interval data assumption should
have little impact. 55 Since OLS coefficients are relatively easily interpreted and most research indicates little loss in precision should result,
from high school and "0" if he has. ED2 is a dummy variable that takes on the value of "1" if the
respondent has some college education, but has not graduated and "0" if he has no college or has
graduated from college. ED3 is a dummy variable that takes on the value "1" if the respondent has
graduated from college and "0" if he has not.
151. CAR is a dummy variable that takes on a value of "0" if the respondent does not have a car
or truck available to him and "1" if he does.
152. SINGLE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of "0" if the respondent is married
and "I" if he or she is unmarried. SINGMOM is also a dummy variable that takes on the value of
"I" if the respondent is an unmarried mother with children under the age of 18 living in her household and "0" otherwise. KIDS is a continuous variable for the number of children, if any, in the
household.
153. See Thomas R. Knapp, Treating Ordinal Scales as Interval Scales. An Attempt to Resolve
the Controversy, 39 NURSING RES. 121 (1990).
154. See, e.g., Ralph B. Brown et al., Community Satisfaction and Social Integration in a Boomtown, 54 RURAL Soc. 568, 576 n.6 (1990); Cook, supra note 148, at 126; Galster & Hesser, supra
note 148, at 739; Lee & Guest, supra note 148, at 299; Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 130, at 85
n.17.
155. See HUBERT M. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 444 (2d ed. 1979); Sanford Labovitz, The
Assignment of Numbers To Rank Order Categories, 35 AM. Soc. REV. 515 (1970).
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Models 1 to 4 in Table 3 are computed according to the OLS procedure.
To ensure that the estimates generated by the OLS model do not lead to
inappropriate interpretations of the data, each model is re-estimated in
the appendix using a multinomial ordered probit. 156 Where the results of
the probit analysis are substantially different from the OLS estimates, a
description of the difference is given in the text or accompanying notes.
Models 1 through 4 indicate that neighborhood satisfaction is positively related to owning a car and negatively related to being black or
single, the number of children in the household, the numbers of years at
the same address and living in the western part of the nation or in public
housing. AGE and HISPANIC are marginally significant and positively
related to increased neighborhood satisfaction in two out of the four
models. SINGMOM is marginally significant and negatively related to
neighborhood satisfaction in two of the four models. Although INCOME is statistically insignificant in all four equations, INCOMESQ is
significant and negative implying that as income increases, neighborhood
157
satisfaction increases at a decreasing rate.
Of particular interest, in Models 1 and 2 the estimated coefficient for
living in a suburb is positive and highly significant, suggesting that controlling for personal characteristics, living in the suburbs increases a poor
person's level of neighborhood satisfaction. This result is consistent with
the analysis of frequencies in Table 2. Models 3 and 4 test for racial
differences in the effect living in the suburbs has on neighborhood satisfaction. In both models, the interaction variables for whites and Hispanics show relatively large and highly significant positive effects from living
in suburban communities. For blacks, however, the estimated coefficients are much smaller and marginally significant in only one of the two
models. The probit analysis, however, shows that the coefficient for the
black interaction variable is significant and positive in both of the models, although its magnitude is much smaller than the interaction variables
for whites and Hispanics.
American Housing Survey data from 1987, therefore, provide some
additional support for deconcentration efforts.1 58 Poor households living
156. The probit model is also used in Boehm & Ihlanfeldt, supra note 119. The neighborhood
rating variable is collapsed from ten to five categories for use in the probit. The reason for this
alteration was that certain of the ten categories had relatively few responses, generating a statistical
difficulty akin to multicollinearity.
157. The probit analysis is generally consistent with the OLS results except as described herein.
BLACK and SINGMOM have the same signs as they do in the OLS model, but are insignificant in
all four models. RENT is statistically significant and negatively related to neighborhood satisfaction
in each model and the coefficient for SOUTH is positive and significant.
158. The results of this analysis should be viewed as suggestive rather than conclusive.
Although many personal characteristics were controlled for, many others, no doubt, are relevant,
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TABLE

3:

NEIGHBORHOOD SATISFACTION

(OLS)

VARIABLE

MODEL 1

MODEL 2

MODEL 3

MODEL 4

CONSTANT

6.511181*
(16.40)

6.455251*
(16.18)

6.517631*
(16.39)

6.459459*
(16.16)

SUBDUM

0.682060*
(7.12)

0.670248*
(6.98)

WHSUBDUM

0.676096*
(5.82)

0.669550*
(5.75)

BLSUBDUM

0.359987***
(1.78)

0.326190
(1.60)

HISUBDUM

1.258663*
(4.72)

1.251094*
(4.69)

INCOME

0.000041
(1.16)

0.000042
(1.19)
-0.000005**
(-1.91)

0.000038
(1.07)
-0.000005***
(-1.83)

INCOMESQ

-0.000005"**
(-1.86)

0.000037
(1.04)
-0.000005***
(-1.78)

RENT

-0.198764
(-1.62)

-0.142688
(-1.14)

-0.201277
(-1.64)

-0.145171
(-1.16)

BLACK

-0.315215"
(-2.84)

-0.295736*
(-2.65)

-0.260834**
(-2.03)

-0.23491 I***
(-1.82)

-0.066517
(0.37)

-0.067175
(0.38)

HISP

0.250024***
(1.69)

0.249739***
(1.69)

NE

0.024695
(0.19)

0.030650
(0.23)

0.045183
(0.34)

0.051927
(0.39)

SOUTH

0.155380
(1.35)

0.149687
(1.30)

0.180176
(1.56)

0.175254
(1.51)

-0.250485***
(-1.77)

-0.247440**
(-1.75)

-0.268284***
(-1.89)

WEST

-0.229083
(-1.63)

EDO

0.100105
(0.98)

0.109927
(1.07)

0.096179
(0.90)

0.106276
(1.04)

ED2

0.139300
(0.95)

0.119237
(0.81)

0.138097
(0.94)

0.118617
(0.81)

ED3

0.067049
(0.35)

0.048354
(1.25)

0.069778
(0.36)

0.052087
(0.27)

CAR

0.225637**
(2.15)

0.205006***
(1.94)

0.229819**
(2.19)

0.209970**
(1.99)

AGE

0.021898
(1.60)

0.024126***
(1.75)

0.021079
(1.54)

0.023207***
(1.69)

AGESQ

0.000260
(0.20)

0.000135
(0.10)

0.000336
(0.26)

0.000219
(0.17)

SINGLE

-0.376284*
(-3.00)

-0.371949*
(-2.96)

-0.373468*
(-2.97)

-0.368095*
(-2.93)

SINGMOM

-0.248458***
(-1.68)

-0.252781**
(-1.70)

-0.223556
(-1.50)

KIDS

-0.129681*
(-2.43)

-0.120659**
(-2.42)

-0.116315**
(-2.34)

-0.116329**
(-2.33)

TENYRS

-0.025652**
(-2.50)

-0.024876**
(-2.42)

-0.025632**
(-2.49)

-0.024832**
(-2.42)

TENYRSQ

0.000327***
(1.78)

PROJECTS
OBSERVATIONS
2
Adj. R

-0.219339
(-1.47)

0.000304***
(1.65)
-0.353357**
(-2.54)

3,484
.10
* p < .01
**p < .05

0.000323**
(1.76)
-

3,469
3,484
.10
.10
***p < .10
Note: T statistics are in parentheses.

0.000300
(1.63)
-0.349868**
(-2.52)
3,469
.10
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in suburban locations report fewer neighborhood problems and seem to
be more content with their neighborhoods than their urban counterparts.
Nevertheless, the results also suggest that the effect of living in the suburbs is weaker for black households than it is for whites and Hispanics.
This apparent differential impact may be caused by differences in the
types of suburban neighborhoods in which blacks and other racial groups
live. Empirical studies consistently show that although black
suburbanization has increased over the past twenty years, residential patterns in the suburbs are segregated.1 59 To the extent that poor blacks
have moved into segregated suburban communities composed of similar
people, they may still suffer from the problems they thought they had left
behind in the city.
Resolving or ameliorating the problems of the inner city ghetto is an
enormously complex undertaking. Each alternative, whether it be enrichment or deconcentration, is expensive and presents almost as many
potential problems as it solves. It would be simplistic to believe that any
one approach is optimal in solving the problem of concentrated poverty
in all cities where ghettos exist. Under certain circumstances, fostering
economic development or improving transportation links between central
cities and suburbs' 6° may provide an efficient and effective solution to
but not included in the American Housing Survey. Thus the potential effects of selective migration
cannot be totally ignored. See supra note 146. In addition, the analysis uses a national sample and
therefore aggregates an enormous number of cities and suburbs. As I discuss in Part I, the benefits
of deconcentration are likely to be greatest in the largest cities, especially those located in the Northeast and Midwest. One might expect the differences between urban and suburban residents to be
even greater in a sample limited to these metropolitan areas. I am presently engaged in a study using
the metropolitan samples of the American Housing Survey that examines urban/suburban differences in ten of the nation's largest metropolitan statistical areas. The metropolitan samples permit
much greater control over demographic variables since one can identify location of residence in submunicipal zones. See Nelson, supra note 46, at 3-4.
159. See John R. Logan & Mark Schneider, Racial Segregation and Racial Change in American
Suburbs, 1970-1980, 89 AM. J. Soc. 874, 887 (1984) (During the 1970s racial segregation increased
in the northern suburbs and decreased in Sunbelt suburbs.); Douglas S. Massey & Nancy Denton,
Suburbanization and Segregation in U.S. MetropolitanAreas, 94 AM. J. Soc. 592, 621 (1988) ("When
suburban residence is achieved by blacks, segregation is reduced, but it remains quite high compared
with other minority groups.").
160. See MARK A. HUGHES, FIGHTING POVERTY IN CITIES: TRANSPORTATION PROGRAMS As
BRIDGES TO OPPORTUNITY (National League of Cities Research Report, 1989). A policy to improve transportation links between central cities and areas of employment in the suburbs is likely to
have only limited success. Suburban employment centers are more dispersed than those in the inner
city and are frequently difficult to reach by public transit. Therefore a transportation-oriented policy
would likely be prohibitively expensive. In addition, there is some evidence that even if access were
improved, employers would avoid hiring inner city residents based on the use of stereotypes tied to
their location of residence. See Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire
Them, But... " The Meaning ofRace for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 215 (Chris-

topher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991). (Survey of Chicago area employers reveals negative
attitude toward job applicants from the inner city.); Kathryn M. Neckerman & Joleen Kirschenman,
HiringStrategies, RacialBias, and Inner-City Workers, 38 SOC. PROB. 433, 435 (1991) (same). Furthermore, improved transportation would not improve information about suburban job openings,
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particular problems. Nevertheless, a deconcentration strategy seems to
offer the best long term strategy for resolving the spatial mismatch of
jobs and residences and breaking the hold of concentrated poverty. Such
a strategy, however, must avoid merely dumping minority households in
communities where the social problems of the ghetto will be reproduced.
Instead, to be effective, deconcentration must involve the entire metro6
politan area. ' '

III.

DECONCENTRATION AND LAW

Deconcentration of the ghetto cannot occur to any appreciable degree without legal change. To date, most legislators and judges have
either been unresponsive to or ineffective in efforts to open up the suburbs. In this part, I examine how the law facilitates or impedes efforts to
promote deconcentration.
A.

FederalLaw

Federal law provides only limited assistance to those who wish to
deconcentrate inner city ghetto populations. In this section, I examine
how the law affects two elements of a comprehensive deconcentration
strategy: (1) the relaxation of zoning requirements and (2) the maintenance of integrated communities.
1. Relaxation of Zoning Barriers
Restrictive suburban zoning may be challenged by landowners on
the ground that their property rights have been diminished or by low
income households claiming that the land use regulations wrongfully exclude them from the jurisdiction. Landowner challenges to zoning ordinances under federal law are usually based upon the argument that the
regulation impairs property rights in violation of either the Constitution's Due Process or Just Compensation Clauses. 162 Due process challenges to zoning are seldom successful. 163 The first Supreme Court case
nor would it improve the quality of education in inner city neighborhoods or diminish the neighborhood effects of concentrated poverty.
161. A requirement that deconcentration involve all suburbs in a given metropolitan area would
also remove the incentive for existing residents to move elsewhere so as to avoid the burden of
increased social service requirements or the perceived negative effects of living in close proximity to
households of different races or socioeconomic classes.
162. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The Just Compensation Clause applies to states and
municipalities by virtue of its incorporation through the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago B. &
Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
163. But see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (Zoning ordinance that forbids a grandmother from living with two sets of grandchildren who are not siblings violates substantive due process.).
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on the constitutionality of zoning, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,'64 established the deferential approach federal courts take in disposing of due
process lawsuits. In Euclid, Ambler Realty owned a parcel of land located in between a major thoroughfare and railroad tracks. The land's
zoning classification did not allow profitable industrial uses. Ambler Realty's due process challenge to the ordinance was rejected by the
Supreme Court on the ground that zoning was well within the village's
police power. The Court determined that it could not say that the ordinance was "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare .... ,"161 In
a rather exceptional passage of dicta, the Court also stated that zoning
ordinances could be used to restrict apartment buildings, a use the Court
characterized as parasitic. 166 Subsequent Court decisions wax lyrical
over the advantages of zoning ordinances that limit multi-family housing
and in so doing preserve zones "where family values, youth values, and
the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary
167
for people."
A similar deference to the land use decisions of municipalities characterizes the Court's takings jurisprudence. Under the Just Compensation Clause, "private property [shall not] be taken for public use without
just compensation." 168 The Court has determined that government regulations that do not physically appropriate private property may still constitute a taking if they "go too far." 169 Nevertheless, the Court has
upheld most instances of land use regulation on the ground that the landowner did not lose all viable use of the property 170 or that the regulation
prohibited the landowner from maintaining a nuisance. 17' Under current
164. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
165. Id. at 395.
166. "[In such sections of [developments of detached housing] very often the apartment house is
a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district. Moreover, the coming of one apartment
house is followed by others, interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and
monopolizing the rays of the sun .... " Id. at 394.
167. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (upholding zoning ordinance that
prohibited more than two unrelated people from living in house).
168. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
169. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule at least
is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.").
170. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (dicta) (justifying zoning ordinance on
ground that it did not deprive owner of all viable use of property); Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (upholding historic landmarking of Grand Central
Terminal partly on ground that owner can earn a "reasonable return" on its investment).
171. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1926) (upholding ordinance making it
illegal to operate brickworks). An independent theory occasionally used to justify zoning is that the
regulation creates a "reciprocity of advantage." Although zoning ordinances might harm a land-
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constitutional jurisprudence, a landowner whose plans to build low cost
housing in the suburbs are blocked by a restrictive zoning ordinance is
virtually certain to lose if he bases his legal challenge on the impairment
172
of his property rights.
Challenges to restrictive zoning ordinances by households excluded
from municipalities on the ground that the ordinances violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution are also unlikely to
succeed. State and local actions that treat people unequally are usually
upheld by courts as long as they are rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. To challenge successfully a government action
such as exclusionary zoning on equal protection grounds, one must normally show either that the policy discriminates against members of a suspect class or burdens a fundamental right. 1 73 Challenges to exclusionary
zoning ordinances by low income households are unlikely to succeed because the poor are not deemed to be members of a suspect class 174 and
175
housing is not a fundamental right.
In areas where concentrated inner city poverty is most severe, however, a disproportionate number of households are nonwhite and thus
members of a suspect class. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has placed
a rather formidable roadblock in the way of constitutional challenges to
suburban zoning by or on behalf of inner city blacks. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corpo,176 a nonprofit sponsor of low income housing arranged to purchase property in
Arlington Heights, a suburb of Chicago in which only 27 of the 64,000
residents were black. After the village refused the developer's request to
rezone a 15 acre site from single-family dwelling use to multi-family
owner by diminishing the value of his property, the landowner also benefits from restrictions placed
upon others. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262 (in assessing the fairness of zoning ordinances, benefits to
landowners must be considered as well as diminution of value); Pennsylvania Cent., 438 U.S. at 147
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("While zoning at times reduces individual property values, the burden is
shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to conclude that on the whole an individual who is
harmed by one aspect of the zoning will be benefited by another.").
172. But cf. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (Requirement that landowner contribute easement to state in return for building permit violated Just Compensation
Clause.); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (Placement of a strip of land in residential district did not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.).
173. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). But see City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating zoning ordinance on grounds that it was
not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose). If a government action discriminates
against members of a suspect class or burdens a fundamental right, the action must typically be
necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose in order to survive scrutiny. See Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 17.
174. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 18-29.
175. See Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
176. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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housing, the developer challenged the failure to rezone under constitutional and statutory grounds. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that although there was no evidence of discriminatory intent,
the failure to rezone had a discriminatory impact on blacks and therefore
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 177 The Supreme Court reversed
the appellate court's ruling on the ground that discriminatory effect was
insufficient to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause; proof of
racially discriminatory intent was required. 78
The requirement that plaintiffs show that a municipality's zoning
laws are motivated by a racially discriminatory intent is often insurmountable. In many instances, zoning ordinances that today have a disproportionate impact on minorities were enacted decades ago for nondiscriminatory purposes. Attributing the failure of city officials to grant
a variance or rezone to racial animus may be extremely difficult, even in
instances where the illegal motive exists. Isolated statements by ill-advised officials may be insufficient to hold the city liable. Furthermore, as
I described in Part II, land use decisions that harm the inner city poor
can easily and persuasively be justified on racially neutral grounds such
as preserving a community's tax base or "community character."
A more useful tool for challenging exclusionary zoning practices is
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly called the Fair
Housing Act. 179 The Fair Housing Act provides, in part, that "it shall be
unlawful... [t]o make unavailable or deny ...a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, or national origin."' 80 Federal courts
have interpreted this language to apply to local zoning actions that obstruct the construction of low cost housing when the absence of the housing would disproportionately harm blacks.181 Although the Supreme
Court has never ruled on the matter, federal appellate courts have also
held that Title VIII permits a plaintiff to obtain relief even though he is
unable to prove discriminatory intent. Instead, the plaintiff must prove a
prima facie case in which he shows that the effect of the municipality's
177. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 517 F.2d 409, 413-15
(7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
178. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(disproportionate impact insufficient to prove violation of Equal Protection Clause).
179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631, as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 3601(a) (1988). The Fair Housing Act was amended in 1988 to protect handicapped individuals and families with children under the age of 18. See Fair Housing Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988).
181. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff'd,
488 U.S. 15 (1988); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283
(7th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975).
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refusal to rezone or grant a variance disproportionately affects groups
protected by the statute including racial minorities. 8 2 Once the plaintiff
proves a prima facie case of discriminatory effect the burden shifts to the
defendant to show that its zoning decision was motivated by legitimate,
83
non-racial concerns and that no less discriminatory alternative exists.
The recent case of Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington 184 illustrates how the Fair Housing Act can be utilized to break down
exclusionary zoning. Huntington is a town on Long Island whose population is 95% white. Most of the blacks in the community are concentrated in two neighborhoods, the only locations in the town zoned for
multi-family housing. A developer of subsidized housing obtained an option to purchase a parcel of land in a white section of the municipality on
which he planned to build a 162 unit housing project. The developer
petitioned the town for a rezoning which was refused. The town based
its rejection of the rezoning petition upon a ntimber of concerns including transportation problems, potential disruption of residential neighborhoods and the siphoning off of demand for housing in the town's urban
renewal area. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that
the town's refusal to rezone had a racially discriminatory effect since it
would disproportionately harm blacks and would reinforce segregative
patterns in the community. 8 5 The court then determined that the reasons offered by the town for its decision were insufficient to outweigh the
discriminatory effect of its refusal to rezone. The court granted injunctive relief ordering the town to rezone the land so that the developer
could build the housing project. The court also struck the provision in
the zoning ordinance that limited multi-family housing to the urban renewal area.
Despite Huntington, challenges to suburban zoning ordinances
182. See Huntington, 844 F.2d at 939; Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184. But cf Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d at 1290 (prima facie case includes four factors: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's showing of
discriminatory effect; (2) the existence of discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy Equal
Protection requirements; (3) the defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4)
whether the plaintiff seeks to compell the defendant to affirmatively provide housing or merely restrain it from interfering with the provision of housing by the private sector).
Title VIII has also been used to attack zoning ordinances on the ground that they discriminate
against those with physical or mental handicaps. See, e.g., Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991) (challenging denial of special permit for group home for
substance abusers); Devereux Foundation v. O'Donnell, No. 89-6134, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 3188
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 1991) (zoning ordinance discriminated against mentally handicapped).
183. See Huntington, 844 F.2d at 939; Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d
Cir. 1977). The Eighth Circuit requires that once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case of
discriminatory effect, a defendant must prove its actions were necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest. See Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185.
184. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
185. See id. at 938.
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under federal law are somewhat limited. Title VIII does not apply to
discrimination against low income households; instead it is limited to
protecting particular groups such as racial minorities. Nevertheless,
since metropolitan areas with the greatest amount of concentrated poverty are also likely to have inner cities disproportionately composed of
blacks or Hispanics, the scope of the Act is unlikely to prove too much of
a problem to deconcentration. Challenges under the Fair Housing Act,
however, are likely to be time-consuming and expensive. As the Second
Circuit indicated in Huntington, federal appellate courts do not usually
fashion the type of sweeping remedy that it ordered. Instead of ordering
a rezoning and invalidating the town's restriction on multi-family housing, the usual case will involve a remand to the trial court to weigh alternative sites.18 6 Remedies usually will be limited to one development in
one jurisdiction rather than wholesale changes in zoning ordinances.

8 7

For suburbs that have not been found to have engaged in discriminatory activities, federal law restricts the power of federal courts to require them to participate in efforts to deconcentrate the ghetto, even in
instances where the central city or other suburbs have been found liable
for discriminatory practices and an effective remedy would be impossible
without the "innocent" suburbs' participation. In Milliken v. Bradley,188
the Supreme Court overturned a district court's remedy in a school desegregation case against the Detroit Board of Education and state officials. The district court had found that Detroit school officials
intentionally fostered a segregated school system. The court also found
the state officials vicariously liable for the actions of the Detroit Board of
Education as well as for their own actions or inaction in promoting a
segregated system. 18 9 The court ordered a desegregation plan that would
186. See id. at 941-42. The court determined that the case was not ordinary because of the
protracted nature of the litigation and the absence of good faith on the part of the town. See id. at
941.
187. Recent Supreme Court doctrine in the employment discrimination area may also limit the
utility of Title VIII. In Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court
ruled that once a plaintiff proves a prima facie case that an employment practice has a discriminatory effect, the burden of rebutting the prima facie case, does not, as prior law seemed to indicate,
shift to the defendant. Instead, the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion throughout. See id. at
659. The holding in Wards Cove with respect to employment discrimination cases has been overturned by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074
(1991). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court may apply the same analysis it used in Wards Cove to cases
brought under the Fair Housing Act. No federal court has yet applied the Wards Cove holding on
disparate impact to Title VIII cases, yet the fact that much of Title VIII doctrine has relied on Title
VII cases suggests that the case may have an effect on housing litigation. Cf Village of Bellwood v.
Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1533 (7th Cir. 1990) (implying that Wards Cove may have altered Title
VIII disparate impact test).
188. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
189. These actions included failing to fund pupil transportation, permitting a neighboring school
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have involved 54 school districts, none of which, with the exception of
Detroit, had been found liable for discrimination. According to the
court, any less comprehensive remedy would result in an all black school
system surrounded by all white districts.
The Supreme Court overturned the district court's remedy. Based
in part on the values of local autonomy, the Court ruled that:
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts
may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown
that there has been a Constitutional violation within one district that
produces a significant segregative effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or
local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. 1 90
According to the Court, no evidence indicated that the suburban school
districts had independently contributed to the segregation in Detroit.
Furthermore, the Court observed that in only one isolated instance were
the state's actions implicated in affecting the racial composition of
schools outside of Detroit. Therefore, since it did not find a violation in
one district that produced a significant segregative effect in another district, the Court ruled that the suburban districts could not be forced to
participate in the desegregation remedy.
Two years after Milliken, however, the Court approved an interdistrict remedy in Hills v. Gautreaux.191 In Gautreaux, the district court
had found the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and HUD liable for
maintaining segregated public housing in the city of Chicago. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overturned the district court's remedy
in the case on the ground that it did not include the construction or
subsidization of housing units in Chicago's suburbs. The Supreme Court
affirmed the appellate court's insistence on an interdistrict remedy and
attempted to distinguish Milliken. According to the Court, unlike the
suburbs in Milliken, both HUD and CHA had been adjudged to have
violated the law. The remedy, although affecting areas beyond the municipal boundaries where the segregative violations had occurred, would
''not necessarily entail coercion of uninvolved governmental
units .... ",192
Milliken therefore seems to limit the involuntary participation of
district to send black high school students to Detroit schools and impeding a voluntary desegregation plan. Id. at 748-52.
190. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744-45.
191. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
192. Id. at 298.
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suburbs in federal metropolitan deconcentration remedies to instances
where the suburbs themselves have violated the law' 93 or where the state
has used the suburbs to achieve a discriminatory purpose. 194 Suburbs
may not be forced to comply with an interdistrict remedy merely because
the state has been found to violate the law. 195 This rather curious elevation of local autonomy to a constitutional principle 96 can impede deconcentration efforts and lead to anomalous results such as those in United
States v. Yonkers Board of Education.197 In Yonkers, the district court
found that the city of Yonkers had intentionally promoted a pattern of
racial segregation by blocking or limiting the availability of public or subsidized housing in the eastern and northwestern portions of the city. The
court-ordered remedy required the city to build 200 units of public housing in white sections of town and develop a long-term plan to create additional subsidized housing opportunities in those areas. Neighboring
jurisdictions such as Bronxville and Scarsdale have built little or no low
income housing and, through their zoning ordinances, have prevented
the private sector from constructing affordable housing within their borders. 198 Under Milliken, however, the district court in Yonkers was constrained to limit its remedy to further concentrating low income housing
in a relatively poor city with declining employment opportunities rather
193. See, e.g. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404
(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.),
aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.) (state drew local
boundaries with discriminatory purpose), cert. denied sub nom. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. v. Buckley,
449 U.S. 838 (1980).
195. See Lee v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 639 F.2d 1243, 1256 (5th Cir. 1981) ("a federal court
cannot impose liability on individual independent school districts on the basis of a general inverse
respondeat superior theory holding them presumptively responsible for actions of the state or another governmental entity ....").
196. A black letter principle of local government law holds that local governments derive their
authority from states and, in the absence of state constitutional protections, can be abolished or
restructured by states. Cities are viewed as creatures of states, whose powers are to be strictly construed. See 1 JOHN FORREST DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 55, 111 (2d ed.
1873). Except possibly for their rights in property held in a proprietary capacity for their residents,
municipalities are entitled to no independent protection under the United States Constitution. See
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). In Milliken, however, the Court treats municipalities as
independent of their creator, the state. The suburbs are generally not responsible for the discriminatory acts of the state; the state is not vicariously liable for the illegal acts of its cities. In insulating
municipalities from states and vice-versa, the Court neglects to make clear its constitutional source.
If local autonomy is the motivating value, the Court's evaluation of the benefits and costs of such a
principle is unsatisfying. For thoughtful analyses of local autonomy compare Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) with Gerald E. Frug,
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980).
197. 635 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd. 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1055 (1988).
198. See Peter D. Salins, A Tale of Racism in the Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1988, at A27.
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than facilitating the movement of the poor to locations of greater
opportunity.
2.

Integration Maintenance

One of the principal barriers to effective deconcentration of poor,
predominantly black households to the suburbs is the destabilizing influence such a population shift would likely have. Opinion polls indicate
that the majority of whites would not object to a small number of blacks
as neighbors. However, the prospect of large numbers of black neighbors
would cause them to oppose the migration and, if unsuccessful, move
themselves. 199 Regardless of whether whites are motivated by racism or
are using race as a proxy for lower socioeconomic status, to be effective
deconcentration efforts must take their views into account. Otherwise,
efforts to achieve deconcentration either will be frustrated by community
opposition or lead to the exodus of white households and the reproduction of concentrated poverty.
Early proponents of deconcentration recognized that white fears of
neighborhood change needed to be accommodated as part of any effort to
open up the suburbs. For example, Downs argues that for many suburbs, deconcentration strategies must include devices that would limit
the proportion of low and moderate income households entering the
community. 20° Recent federal court decisions, however, may limit the
ability of municipalities or private developers of housing to place numerical ceilings on lower income households because of the disproportionate
impact such restrictions would likely have on racial minorities. In
United States v. Starrett City Associates,20° a private developer built a
large federally subsidized housing complex in Brooklyn, New York
called Starrett City. To avoid "tipping," Starrett City established a set of
racial quotas: 64% of the apartments were reserved for whites, 22% for
blacks and 8% for Hispanics. In 1979 a group of black applicants challenged the quotas in federal court. The suit was settled in 1984 with
Starrett City agreeing to increase the proportion of minorities over a five
year period. Shortly thereafter, the federal government challenged the
quota system as violative of the Fair Housing Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court in ruling that although Starrett City may have been motivated by
the worthy objective of maintaining integration, its methods violated Ti199. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
200. See DOWNS, supra note 80, at 141.
201. 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
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tle VIII. Admitting that a tension exists in the Fair Housing Act between the objectives of integration and non-discrimination, 20 2 the court
ruled that race conscious housing plans must be temporary, designed to
remedy some history of racial discrimination and should increase the
representation of minorities rather than set a ceiling on their admission. 20 3 The court found that Starrett City's integration maintenance
scheme violated each of these guidelines. 2°4 If ceilings on the number of
low income households were explicitly or implicitly adopted by suburbs 20 5 so as to discourage the flight of middle and upper income households, it is likely that the restrictions would be challenged under the Fair
Housing Act. On their face, the ceilings would be racially neutral, and
therefore distinguishable from the quotas at issue in Starrett City. Nevertheless, the restrictions might be subjected to similar treatment on the
20 6
ground that they disproportionately burden racial minorities.
A second approach to integration maintenance does not seek to
limit directly the influx of nonwhite households into suburban neighborhoods, but instead tries to prevent white households from leaving stable
communities because of their fears of racial transition. Most recent integration maintenance ordinances of this type are designed to counter the
practice of "blockbusting." Blockbusting typically involves the solicitation of white homeowners by real estate brokers. The brokers unnerve
the homeowners with reports that blacks are moving into the neighborhood and predictions that property values will soon fall. The whites sell
their homes at depressed prices to real estate entrepreneurs who, in turn,
sell them to black families at market or above-market prices. In the pro20 7
cess, neighborhood racial composition is rapidly transformed.
The most popular integration maintenance measures-prohibitions
on "For Sale" signs and anti-solicitation ordinances 2 0 8 -have met with
202. See id. at 1101.
203. See id. at 1101-02. The court distinguished an earlier case in which it had approved of
preferential treatment accorded to whites in gaining access to a new public housing project. See
Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973). According to the court, the
integration maintenance mechanism at issue in Otero was limited to the initial rent-up of the new
project and did not operate as a strict quota. See Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1103.
204. See also United States v. Charlottesville Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp.
461, 469-70 (W.D. Va. 1989) (Public housing authority may not give preferential treatment to whites
to maintain a 50/50 mix of black and white residents.).
205. Communities might explicitly restrict the number of low income households or, more
likely, set implicit limits by limited relaxation of zoning regulations or the allocation of limited
amounts of housing subsidies.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 179-83 (Fair Housing Act plaintiffs need not prove discriminatory intent.).
207. For a recent description of blockbusting in Long Island see Michael Alexander, Housing
Split: No End to Trend, NEWSDAY, Sept. 24, 1990, at 7.
208. In addition, municipalities promote affirmative marketing of neighborhoods to various ra-
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mixed success in federal courts. In 1974, the township of Willingboro,
New Jersey enacted a ban on "For Sale" signs to halt "panic selling" on
the part of whites in response to an influx of minority households. The
Supreme Court struck down the ordinance in Linmark Associates v.
Township of Willingboro,20 9 on the ground that it violated the first
amendment guarantee of free speech. The Court held that the sign ban
was not merely a regulation of the time, place or manner of speech, but
also was concerned with the content of the speech itself. Although the
Court acknowledged the importance of the town's objective of promoting
a stable, racially integrated community, it held that the first amendment
prohibited the restriction of information about matters of vital interest to
Willingboro residents. 210 Less restrictive sign regulations such as those
limiting the size or number of "For Sale" signs on a property, however,
21
have been upheld by federal courts. '

Municipalities have also attempted to fight blockbusting by restricting the ability of real estate brokers to solicit homeowners about selling
their properties. Although federal courts have invalidated broad solicitation bans, 2 12 a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit upheld more narrowly drawn ordinances. In South Suburban
Housing Center v. GreaterSouth Suburban Board of Realtors,2 13 several
communities in the Chicago metropolitan area enacted laws that prohibited the solicitation of homeowners to sell or rent their dwellings if the
homeowners had notified town officials that they did not wish to be solicited. The court upheld the ordinance in the face of challenges by local
realtors on Fair Housing Act and first amendment grounds. The court
found that the ordinance would have no racially discriminatory effect
since those families barred from receiving solicitations were those who
would be least likely to offer their homes for sale. 21 4 The ordinances did
cial groups so as to maintain racial balance. For a description of integration maintenance techniques
see JULIET SALTMAN, A FRAGILE MOVEMENT: THE STRUGGLE FOR NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZATION (1990). A recent study by Galster of integration maintenance programs in the Cleveland met-

ropolitan area concludes that these programs may exacerbate the problem they are designed to solve.
Galster reports that white flight was higher in communities with integration maintenance programs
than it was in other nearby communities. See George C. Galster, White Flight from Racially Integrated Neighbourhoods in the 1970s: the Cleveland Experience, 27 URB. STUDIES 385, 395 (1990).
209. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
210. See id. at 96. The Court also expressed its skepticism that the law was necessary to achieve
the objective of integration. See id. at 95-96.
211. See, e.g., South Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
212. See, e.g., Greater Baltimore Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 752 F. Supp. 193 (D.
Md. 1990) (prohibitions on canvassing potential home sellers struck down as violations of the first
amendment).
213. 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
214. See id. at 888.
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not violate the first amendment, because although commercial speech is
entitled to protection under the Constitution, the anti-solicitation laws
directly advanced an important governmental interest and were not more
extensive than necessary to serve that purpose. Interestingly, the court
characterized the governmental interest as protecting the privacy of local
2 15
residents rather than promoting integration.

B.

State Law

In recent years, a small number of state courts and legislatures have
taken an active role in redressing inequities among municipalities. In
this section, I examine two areas of legal development that potentially
affect the movement of poor households from cities to suburbs. Since the
late 1960s, a handful of state courts and legislatures have acted to curb
the exclusionary zoning practices of suburbs and facilitate the construction of low cost housing. To date, the quantity of housing constructed as
a result of these efforts is quite small. Courts and legislatures have been
much more active in redressing disparities among municipalities in the
amount of resources available to fund education. Although tax base
equalization may, at first glance, appear to be an urban enrichment strategy, it is quite conceivable that, in the long run, it will facilitate deconcentration by reducing the incentives of suburban residents to zone out
lower income households and by providing additional incentives for the
poor to migrate to the suburbs.
1. Exclusionary Zoning
State legislative efforts to increase low and moderate income housing
in the suburbs have had extremely limited success. One of the earliest
legislative initiatives was the creation in the late 1960s of New York's
Urban Development Corporation (UDC). The UDC's mission was to
build low and moderate income housing. The legislation creating the
corporation gave it the power to override local zoning ordinances. Initially, the UDC successfully constructed subsidized housing in several
cities. Once the UDC began constructing subsidized housing in the suburbs, however, not even the popularity of its chief patron, Governor Nel215. See id. at 890-95. See also Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding
state anti-solicitation regulation similar to those of Chicago suburbs in South Suburban Housing
Center). In South Suburban Housing Center, the Seventh Circuit also upheld an affirmative marketing plan under which brokers for certain homes were required to follow special outreach activities to
attract white homebuyers. The court held that the plan did not violate the Fair Housing Act because it did not deter black homebuyers, but merely increased competition in the housing market.
See South Suburban Houi Ctr., 935 F.2d at 883-84.
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son Rockefeller, could save it from angry state legislators. In 1973, the
legislature stripped the UDC of its power to override local zoning and
empowered localities to veto proposed residential developments. 2 16 After
having its powers limited, the UDC, for the most part, ceased its housing
operations in the suburbs.
California and Massachusetts have also enacted laws to promote the
construction of affordable housing in suburban locations. In California,
municipalities are required to estimate their fair share of regional housing needs and develop plans to provide the housing. 2 17 The statute also
restricts the freedom of municipalities to disapprove housing developments affordable to low and moderate income households. 2 18 In Massachusetts, a state agency has been given the authority to override local
land use decisions that impede low income housing construction where
the decisions are not "reasonable in view of the regional need for low and
moderate income housing ....,,219 Neither of these statutes has been
very effective in increasing suburban low income housing opportunities.
The California statute requires planning for regional housing needs, but
contains no enforcement mechanism if the plans do not successfully lead
to housing construction. 220 The Massachusetts law only authorizes zoning overrides if the developer of the proposed housing is a non-profit
sponsor or a state agency. 221 Furthermore, if ten percent of the housing
in a locality is already affordable to low and moderate income households, the state may not override its land use regulations regardless of the
magnitude of regional need. 222
In the face of legislative inaction, a small number of state courts
have acted to break down the barriers imposed by exclusionary zoning. 22 3 State courts in California, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
216. See MICHAEL N.

DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION

320-21 (1976).

217. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65583 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
218. Nevertheless, the statute provides numerous conditions under which municipalities may
disapprove housing developments. Among the most important are situations where the proposed
project would have an adverse impact on the public health or safety (which cannot be remedied or
mitigated without rendering the project unaffordable) and instances where the proposed development is inconsistent with the jurisdiction's general plan land use designation. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65589.5 (West Supp. 1991).
219. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20, 23 (Law. Co-op 1983 & Supp. 1991).
220. The legislation seems to rely on private enforcement. The statute provides that if any municipality is sued for denying approval of a housing project or imposing restrictions which have a
substantial adverse effect on the viability of the project, the municipality would have the burden of
proving that its actions were consistent with the statute's legislative findings. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65589.5(i) (West Supp. 1991).
221. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 21 (Law. Co-op 1983 & Supp. 1991).
222. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 20. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I- The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 69 (1990).
223. Restrictive zoning ordinances have also been invalidated by some state courts as impairing
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York and Pennsylvania have stated explicitly that municipal zoning ordinances must take into account the welfare of people living outside their
borders. 2 24 In each of these states, courts have held zoning ordinances of
individual municipalities unconstitutional as applied to particular proposed developments. For example, in Surrick v. Zoning Hearing
Board,22 5 a developer proposed to build apartments and townhouses in
Upper Providence Township, a suburb of Philadelphia. The land the developer owned was zoned for single family dwellings on one acre lots.
Upon having his requests for rezoning and a variance rejected by township officials, the developer brought suit challenging the local zoning ordinance. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower court rulings
in favor of the township and invalidated the ordinance. The court explicitly restated its "fair share" principle, "which requires local political
units to plan for and provide land-use regulations which meet the legitimate needs of all categories of people who may desire to live within its
boundaries. '226 The court determined that the township did not fulfill its
fair share responsibility because the municipality was a logical area for
population growth and development, but had a zoning ordinance that
permitted multi-family dwellings on only 1.14% of the township's
land.

2 27

the property rights of landowners. See, e.g., Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 528 (Ariz. App.
Ct. 1985), aff'd, 720 P.2d 513 (Ariz. 1986) (Placement of 74% of parcel in conservation district
effected a taking.); Burrows v. City of Keene, 432 A.2d 15 (N.H. 1981) (Placement of land in conservation district constituted a compensable taking.); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 125
N.E.2d 609 (Ill. 1955) (Zoning amendment that made it impossible to build a ten story apartment
building was not sufficiently related to the general welfare and imposed substantial financial hardships on the owner.). Some state courts also scrutinize carefully attempts by municipalities to impose costly exactions on developers proposing to subdivide land. See, e.g., Lafferty v. Payson City,
642 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1982) (invalidating impact fee); Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mt.
Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961) ("If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power
to the municipality and if the burden cast upon the subdivision is specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity, then the requirement is permissible ...").
224. See Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473,
487 (Cal. 1976); Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (N.H. 1991); Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 727-28 (N.J.), appeal dismissed and
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242 (N.Y.
1975); National Land Investment Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (Pa. 1965).
225. 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977).
226. 382 A.2d at 108.
227. 382 A.2d at 111-12. For a discussion of recent developments in Pennsylvania law with
respect to the Surrick doctrine see CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL A. WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING 411-13 (4th ed. 1989). Roisman and Tegeler have argued that Pennsylvania court rulings have
not been particularly helpful in increasing low income housing opportunities because they focus on
the exclusion of particular types of housing rather than housing for low income groups. See Florence W. Roisman & Philip Tegeler, Improving and Expanding Housing Opportunitiesfor Poor People of Color: Recent Developments in Federaland State Courts, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 312, 345
(1990). This criticism, however, is not convincing. New construction of market-rate housing
should, in the long run, increase housing opportunities for low income households due to filtering.
See supra text accompanying note 84. Programs geared explicitly to increasing low income housing
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To date, only the New Jersey Supreme Court has ordered a systematic revamping of municipal zoning practices as a response to the problem of exclusionary zoning. 228 In its 1975 decision, Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 1)229 the
court invalidated the zoning ordinance of Mount Laurel and set forth a
requirement that every developing municipality:
must, by its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing. More specifically,
presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for low and moderate income housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the extent
fair share of the present and prospective regional
of the municipality's
230
need therefor.
Mount Laurel I was the first and thus far only exclusionary zoning decision of a state supreme court to explicitly adopt the spatial mismatch
hypothesis and embrace the principle of deconcentration. The court observed that industry and retail businesses had left the cities creating increased unemployment and a decline in city services:
[L]ow income employees very frequently could not afford to reach outlying places of suitable employment and they certainly could not afford
the permissible housing near such locations ....

This category of city

dwellers desperately needs much better housing and living conditions
than is available to23them
now, both in a rehabilitated city and in outly1
ing municipalities.
The court's remedy in Mount Laurel I was to order the township to
revise its zoning ordinance in accordance with the decision. Eight years
later, however, the court once again addressed exclusionary zoning in
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel
(Mount Laurel I1).232 In Mount Laurel II, the court expressed its frustration that Mount Laurel and other municipalities in New Jersey had
such as inclusionary zoning, may, to the contrary, reduce housing opportunities for the poor by
dampening new construction. See Ellickson, supra note 112, at 151-55. But cf Jeffrey I. Rubin &
Joseph Seneca, Density Bonuses, Exactions, and the Supply of Affordable Housing, 30 J. URB. ECON.
208, 221 (1991) (Density bonuses and exactions may increase the supply of affordable housing and
improve economic welfare.).
228. Other state courts engage in a case-by-case analysis of zoning laws to determine whether
they promote the general welfare. See, e.g., Britton, 595 A.2d at 498 (Once a court finds a zoning
ordinance invalid on the ground that it excludes low and moderate income housing, plaintiff has the
burden of showing that its proposed use is reasonable.); Suffolk Hous. Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven,
511 N.E.2d 67, 70 (N.Y. 1987) (discussing particularized approach based on individual parcels.or
projects). Case-by-case approaches to zoning reform are expensive and time-consuming and may be
one reason why exclusionary zoning has been relatively unaffected by litigation in these states. See
Briffault, supra note 222, at 45-46.
229. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
230. 336 A.2d at 724.
231. Id.
232. 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
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not relaxed their land use regulations to make possible the construction
of low and moderate income housing. The court reiterated its deconcentration objective 23 3 and strengthened its earlier decision in Mount Laurel
234 It
I, extending the obligation to provide housing to all municipalities.
would no longer be sufficient for municipalities merely to reduce barriers
to low-cost housing; in the future they would also be required to undertake affirmative measures to create such housing, including assisting developers in obtaining public subsidies and adopting inclusionary zoning
techniques. 235 Perhaps most importantly, the court established the concept of the builder's remedy: If a developer proposing to build housing
that included a substantial 236 number of units affordable to lower income
households could show that a municipality had not met its fair share
obligation, a court should ordinarily order the municipality to permit
2 37
construction of both the market- and below market-rate housing.
Mount Laurel II set off an explosion of controversy in New Jersey
communities. The builder's remedy, in particular, threatened the ability
of communities to control their growth since a successful developer
would not only be able to construct low-cost units, but would also be able
to construct up to four times as many market-rate homes. Given the
booming housing market in the mid-1980s, litigation swelled as developers proposed housing developments and increased housing for moderate
income households appeared close to becoming a reality. 238 In response
to this controversy, the New Jersey legislature enacted the Fair Housing
Act of 1985,239 upheld by the Supreme Court in Hills Development Co. v.
Township of Bernards (Mount Laurel III).24 0 The Act established the
233. 456 A.2d at 415-16 & n.5.
234. The court exempted from the fair share obligation parts of the state that were not designated in the State Development Guidance Plan as "growth areas" and environmentally sensitive
areas such as the Pinelands. 456 A.2d at 429-35.
235. 456 A.2d at 442-50. Among the inclusionary zoning techniques specifically mentioned by
the court were incentive zoning and mandatory set-asides. Incentive zoning would permit developers to build at higher densities than the zoning ordinance would ordinarily allow provided that they
also constructed some housing for low and moderate income households. Mandatory set-asides
would require developers of market-rate housing also to build a certain number of subsidized or
below market-rate housing units. For a thoughtful critique of inclusionary zoning programs see
Ellickson, supra note 112, at 148-66.
236. The court observed that a substantial number of lower income units appeared to be 20% of
the project. See 456 A.2d at 452 n.37.
237. 456 A.2d at 452-53.
238. Most housing constructed under the Mount Laurel rulings is not, however, affordable by
poor families. See Martha Lamar et al., Mount Laurel At Work- Affordable Housing In New Jersey,
1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1197, 1214-15 (1989) (Survey of 54 municipalities shows 2,830
units of housing have been completed, but most units affordable to low income households are for
the elderly.).

239. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to D-329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
240. 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986).
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Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) whose purpose is to develop
fair share requirements for individual municipalities and to certify
whether a locality's plan makes "the achievement of the municipality's
fair share of low and moderate income housing realistically possible
....

"241

The Act establishes a moratorium on the controversial builder's

remedy and transferred all pending Mount Laurel litigation to COAH.
The Act also permits a municipality to transfer to another city up to one
half of its Mount Laurel housing obligation provided that the two municipalities consummate a "regional contribution agreement" establishing
an appropriate amount of compensation for the receiving jurisdiction. In
upholding the Fair Housing Act, the New Jersey Supreme Court expressed relief that the legislature had finally taken action in response to
the Mount Laurel cases. The court also predicted that most municipalities would apply to COAH for approval of their fair share housing plans
because certification would substantially insulate them from further
242
Mount Laurel litigation.
In Mount Laurel III, the court failed to address and therefore implicitly endorsed a change in direction implemented by the state legislature. Deconcentration and the reduction of exclusionary zoning are no
longer the primary objectives of New Jersey law in this area. Through
the concept of regional contribution agreements, the legislature, with the
approval of the court, has placed enrichment on an equal footing with
deconcentration. Although regional contribution agreements may improve housing conditions for inner city poor households, they will do
little to increase employment opportunities or alleviate the social
243
problems associated with concentrated poverty.
2.

Education Finance Reform

Compared to their efforts to relax exclusionary zoning, state courts
and legislators have been considerably more active in revising the way
public education is financed in the United States. Primary and secondary
241. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-314 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
242. This expectation may have been a bit optimistic. As of May 16, 1990, COAH had certified
the fair share plans of only 98 of New Jersey's 567 municipalities. See 98 Towns Receive COAH
Approval, 5 COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING NEWSL. 1 (1990).

243. Fischel has suggested that a fair share approach such as the one initially adopted by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II may actually exacerbate the
shortage of affordable suburban housing. He predicts that municipalities will be tempted to adopt
stringent growth controls so as to avoid any obligation to provide additional units once their initial
fair share requirement is fulfilled. Reduced housing construction would limit the number of units
eventually available to the poor through filtering. See William A. Fischel, Exclusionary Zoning ald
Growth Controls: A Comment On the APA's Endorsement of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 40 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 65, 70-72 (1991).
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education is the largest single expenditure for most localities. Since a
municipality's share of the cost of operating public schools is typically
financed through the property tax, inequities exist with respect to the
resources available to children in different districts. In districts with
large quantities of valuable real estate or relatively small alternative public service needs, the resources available to fund education are much
greater than for districts with little property wealth or high service re244
quirements. In San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez,
the Supreme Court held that a property tax-based system of school finance did not violate the United States Constitution even though it gen245
erated unequal expenditures among districts.
Ten state courts, however, have held that their states' systems of
financing education violate state constitutional articles guaranteeing
equal protection or the efficient provision of education. 246 In one of the
earliest school finance decisions, Serrano v. Priest,247 a group of Los Angeles school children and their parents challenged California's system of
education finance on the ground that its reliance on local property tax
bases violated the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution. The
court observed that under the California Constitution, education is a fundamental interest and discrimination in educational opportunity based
upon district wealth involved a suspect classification. 248 The court held
that the state's reliance on local tax bases generated substantial disparities in educational opportunities for students living in different parts of
California. The state's justification for these disparities, the desirability
of local control over fiscal and educational matters, was insufficient to
244. 411 U.S. 1(1973).
245. 411 U.S. at 54-55.
246. See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest,
557 P.2d 929, 958 (Cal. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 376
A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989);
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575
A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989);
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 98 (Wash. 1978) (en banc); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d
859, 878 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). Courts in fourteen states, however, have upheld their states'
school finance statutes. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Colo.
1982) (en banc); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 370 (N.Y. 1982), appealdismissed, 459
U.S. 1138 (1983). For a full list of the decisions upholding school finance statutes, see Briffault,
-supranote 222, at 25 n.80. At present twenty states are facing court challenges to their school
finance laws. See Rorie Sherman, Tackling EducationFinancing:Lawmakers and Courts Battle Over
DisparitiesAmong School Districts, NAT'L L.J., July 22, 1991, at 1.
247. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (en banc), cert denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
248. 557 P.2d at 951. See also Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250-59 (Cal. 1971) (District
wealth and wealth of residents is a suspect classification and education is a fundamental interest.).

1991]

DECONCENTRA TING THE INNER CITY POOR

meet the stringent strict scrutiny standard applied by the court. 2 49
In a more recent decision, Abbott v. Burke, 25 0 the New Jersey

Supreme Court struck down a school finance statute passed in response
to the court's 1973 decision holding an earlier school finance law unconstitutional. 25 1 The court held that as applied to poorer urban school districts, the new statute violated the state constitutional guarantee of a
"thorough and efficient education." According to the court, a thorough
and efficient education in these poorer urban districts requires that the
state "assure that their educational expenditures per pupil are substantially equivalent to those of the more affluent suburban districts, and
'252
that, in addition, their special disadvantages must be addressed.
In response to court challenges as well as on their own initiative,
many state legislatures have adopted legislation to equalize the disparities
among municipalities in educational resources. Some legislatures have
guaranteed localities a minimum amount of revenue per student. Other
statutes attempt to equalize fiscal capacity among jurisdictions by guaranteeing minimum tax bases. Localities are free to set their own tax
rates. If the revenue generated by applying the chosen tax rate to the
indigenous tax bases is less than the amount that would be obtained by
applying it to the state-guaranteed tax base, the state would pay the district the difference up to a maximum amount. Districts that generate tax
revenue in excess of the amount that would be obtained by applying their
tax rates to the state-guaranteed minimum tax base either do not receive
additional state funds or must pay the difference to the state. A third
strategy adopted by several states is to target financial assistance to those
253
districts with especially high needs.

In those instances where school finance reform is fashioned to alleviate disparities between poor central city and wealthy suburban districts, 254 equalization is usually thought of as an enrichment strategy for
the inner city. Additional resources for inner city schools will, at least in
theory, enable hard-pressed urban districts to improve the quality of education. 25 5 However, greater state assistance to central city school dis249. "It is accordingly clear that the California public school financing system... has not been
shown by the state to be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest." 557 P.2d at 953.
250. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
251. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
252. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 408.
253. For a complete discussion of state funding mechanisms see ELCHANAN COHN & TEIRRY G.
GESKE, THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 313-29 (3d ed. 1990).
254. See, e.g., Abbott, 575 A.2d at 408 (holding that state must assure equivalent expenditui'es
per pupil between poorer urban districts and affluent suburban districts); Edgewood Independent
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989) (comparing Edgewood to Alamo Heights).
255. See, e.g., Abbott, 575 A.2d at 411 (Isolation of the urban poor will continue unless educa-
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tricts and equalized tax bases might also promote deconcentration. In
those states where cities receive additional funds as a result of school
finance reform 256 the "tax price" of public education decreases in the city
and may increase in the suburbs. 257 These positive and negative subsidies
would, in theory, be capitalized into property values with the values of
city residences increasing and suburban housing decreasing. 258 If the city
uses the additional revenues at its disposal primarily to increase expenditures on schools or other public services, tenants would probably experience increased rents attributable to greater competition for housing. 259
tional deficiencies are addressed.); Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 393 (Education finance reform will help
students to escape "cycle of poverty.").
256. Not all school finance reforms will benefit central cities. Many central cities have large tax
bases attributable to industrial and commercial properties. Equalization schemes that redistribute
from jurisdictions with high tax bases to low tax bases may actually create a net loss for some central
cities. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 617-18, supersededand rev. granted, 189 Cal.
App. 3d 539 (2d Dist. 1986) (Los Angeles school district (Baldwin Park) has enjoyed increase in
revenue whereas San Francisco, Oakland and Berkeley districts have suffered losses.). But cf JAMES
HEILBRUN, URBAN ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 432-33 (3d ed. 1987) (The average property
value per capita for the largest 26 cities in 1981 was only 72% of the average of their suburbs.).
257. The tax price of education would increase in wealthy suburban districts if the state adopted
a power equalization program with recapture. Even if the education finance system did not recapture funds from the suburbs, suburban residents would likely pay more in state taxes to fund state
assistance to poor districts.
258. Cf Robert P. Inman, Optimal Fiscal Reform of Metropolitan Schools. Some Simulation
Results, 68 AM. EcON. REV. 107, 118 (1978) (Simulation indicates that district power equalization
would lead to an increased individual tax base in low-base towns and a reduced individual tax base in
high-base towns.); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal
Equity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1737 (1979) (Serrano-type reform will lead to falling land values in
formerly high tax base communities and rising values in those with formerly low tax bases.).
259. States typically provide municipalities several types of educational subsidy including grants
earmarked for particular services (categorical grants), block grants and matching grants. Municipalities may substitute the first two categories of subsidy for locally generated funds and use these funds
to pay for other public services or to reduce local taxes. However, studies have shown that municipalities use a substantial share of their state aid to augment educational expenditures. See, e.g.,
David E. Black et al., Wealth Neutrality and the Demand For Education, 32 NAT'L TAX J. 157, 161
(1979) (Marginal impact of one dollar of Delaware educational block grants on expenditures is $0.77
per pupil.); Elchanan Cohn, Federaland State Grants to Education: Are They Stimulative or Substitutive?, 6 ECON. EDUC. REV. 339, 343 (1987) (Data show that state aid is at least partially and
perhaps fully stimulative.); W. Norton Grubb & Jack W. Osman, The Causes of School Finance
Inequalities: Serrano and the Case of California, 5 PuB. FIN. Q. 373, 379 (1977) (In California, a
$1.00 increase in general purpose state aid leads to a $0.78 increase in educational expenditure per
pupil.); Helen F. Ladd, Local Education Expenditures, Fiscal Capacity, and the Composition of the
Property Tax Base, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 145, 150 (1975) (Fifty cents of each dollar in educational aid is
spent on education with the rest leading to increased levels of expenditures on other services or tax
reductions.). But see ROLLA E. PARK & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, THE SEARCH FOR EQUITY IN
SCHOOL FINANCE: MICHIGAN SCHOOL DISTRICT RESPONSE To A GUARANTEED TAX BASE 24
(1979) (Six cents and thirty-six cents of each dollar of Michigan general and categorical assistance,
respectively, went to increased state educational expenditures.). Equalization assistance now provided in many states is similar to a matching grant. Matching grants typically stimulate even greater
levels of additional expenditure than block grants or categorical assistance. See Paul N. Courant et
al., The Stimulative Effects of Intergovernmental Grants. Or Why Money Sticks Where It Hits, in
FISCAL FEDERALISM AND GRANTS-IN-AID 5, 5 (Peter Mieszkowski & William Oakland eds., 1979).
In the long-run, redistributive state education subsidies may also generate an offsetting effect to
the rent increases attributable to greater competition for housing in the inner city. A portion of the
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Poor tenants might not value the increased services attributable to the
equalization subsidies as much as the median city voter 260 and therefore
be made worse off by higher housing costs. This combination of higher
housing prices in the city and lower housing costs in the suburbs might
make deconcentration marginally more attractive and feasible for inner
26 1
city residents.
School finance reform may also alter the propensity of suburban residents to oppose deconcentration. Although studies show mixed results
with respect to whether state education finance reforms have narrowed
the disparities in revenues available to students living in poor and
wealthy school districts, 262 they have clearly loosened the tie between
school finance and the property tax. 2 63 As the property tax becomes less

important as a source of local revenue, one of the primary objections to
deconcentration among suburban residents will weaken. As suburban
public services are financed to a greater extent by state rather than locally generated revenues, suburban residents should have less of an incentive to exclude housing that will generate tax revenues that do not pay
for the service requirements of its occupants.2 64 Reducing or removing
the fiscal incentive behind exclusionary zoning practices will also leave
state aid is likely to be used by the cities to fund tax relief. This will reduce the cost to landlords of
operating rental housing. If markets are competitive, tax relief should be passed on to tenants in the
form of reduced rents. Some of the short-term effects of reforms such as district power equalization
will also be offset by capitalization. As the tax base of the city rises, it will be entitled to correspondingly lower levels of state aid. See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 258, at 1735 (Changes in family
tax bases will undo a substantial share of the gain in spending and tax equity promised by equalization.); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, JudicialApproaches to Local Public-Sector Equity: An Economic Analysis, in CURRENT ISSUES IN URBAN EcONOMICS 542, 565 (Peter Mieszkowski & Mahlon Straszheim
eds., 1979) (Capitalization will mitigate tendency toward expenditure equality.).
260. Cf Thomas Bogart & Richard Voith, Property Taxes, Homeownership Capitalization
Rates, and Housing Consumption 9-14 (Working Paper No. 91-13, June 1991) (Property tax capitalization is minimized for individuals having income at the seventieth percentile therefore suggesting
that the tax and service mix is most highly valued by the median voter weighted by likelihood of
voting.).
261. Deconcentration may become less attractive to inner city residents if suburban households
respond to reforms such as district power equalization by choosing to fund a very low level of public
services and purchasing needed services through the private sector. To avoid such an occurrence the
state might have to require minimum tax rates or eliminate any recapture. See COHN & GESKE,
supra note 253, at 320. In addition, deconcentration might be impeded if the state were to retain the
property tax as an important source of revenue and state residents responded to redistributive reforms by enacting tax ceilings such as California's Proposition 13. Under Proposition 13, property
assessments can annually increase in excess of 2% only upon the sale of homes. As a result of
Proposition 13, tax burdens have been shifted from long time residents to newcomers. See William
A. Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 465, 472 (1989).
262. For a summary of these empirical studies see COHN & GESKE, supra note 253, at 337-45.
263. From 1970 to 1984, the proportion of United States public elementary and secondary
school expenditures financed by the states increased from 38.5% to 48.0%. See id. at 279.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94. However, if suburban jurisdictions gain no fiscal
benefits from property within their boundaries, they may cease to permit any new development
thereby diminishing opportunities for deconcentration. See FISCHEL, supra note 103, at 326-27.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:795

suburbs with fewer lawful justifications for their land use regulations
thereby making it easier for plaintiffs to succeed in lawsuits based on the
2 65
Equal Protection Clause or the Fair Housing Act.
CONCLUSION

Legal battles over deconcentration reflect the limitations of courts
and the unwillingness of legislators to make substantial progress in deconcentrating the ghetto. In addition to racism, suburban households
are motivated by rational self-interest in opposing efforts to open their
communities to low and moderate income housing. As the Mount Laurel
rulings illustrate, judicial efforts to force racial and socio-economic integration are bound to meet widespread community opposition, delays and
ultimately legislative dilution.
Deconcentration is most likely to succeed if suburban households
find that it is not in their interest to block the construction of new housing in their communities with restrictive land use practices. Equalization
of tax bases and a greater state role in financing public services such as
education may help to create such an environment. Race or class conscious efforts to promote neighborhood stability and ensure suburban residents that their communities will not be transformed into ghettos, no
matter how unpalatable, may also be necessary.
Deconcentration clearly will not be costless. Equalized tax bases
and an increased state role in the finance of public services will reduce
some of the efficiencies associated with a system of decentralized local
governments. Nevertheless maintaining the status quo is also not
costless whether one's metric is dollars or human anguish. Large numbers of ghetto poor are growing up without hope and without the appropriate education or socialization to contribute productively to society.
Although segregating themselves in the suburbs may serve the interests
of large numbers of Americans today, the long term costs of doing nothing to alleviate concentrated ghetto poverty are likely to be tremendous.

265. See supra text accompanying notes 173-87.
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APPENDIX:
VARIABLE

NEIGHBORHOOD (PROBIT ANALYSIS)

MODEL 1

MODEL 2

CONSTANT

0.727696*
(4.428)

0.709465*
(4.290)

SUBDUM

0.312986*
(7.712)

0.308520*
(7.586)

MODEL 3

MODEL 4

0.732775*
(4.440)

0.713773$
(4.297)

WHSUBDUM

0.307634*
(5.859)

0.305600**
(5.810)

BLSUBDUM

0.197218*
(2.696)

0.181555**
(2.468)

HISUBDUM

0.541938*
(4.958)

0.541540**
(4.955)

0.000017
(1.163)

0.000015
(1.068)

0.000016
(1.120)

0.000015
(1.025)

INCOMESQ

-0.022037**
(-2.129)

-0.021371**
(-2.059)

-0.022686*
(-2.192)

-0.021997**
(-2.120)

RENT

-0.108221**
(-2.191)

-0.091110***
(-1.804)

-0.109159*
(-2.206)
-

-0.092442***
(- 1.827)
-0.111819**
(-2.091)

-0.017462
(-0.337)

-0.008332
(-0.161)
0.069763
(0.966)

INCOME

PROJECTS
BLACK

-0.113213**
(-2.119)
- 0.034463

(-0.785)

-0.028468
(-0.647)

HISP

0.140777**
(2.367)

0.139943**
(2.352)

0.070708
(0.981)

NE

0.030667
(0.559)

0.033651
(0.612)

0.038093
(0.691)

SOUTH

0.096032**
(1.984)

0.093044***
(1.918)

0.104925*
(2.148)

0.041483
(0.752)
*e

0.102462*5
(2.093)

WEST

-0.101346***
(- 1.655)

-0.108225***
(-1.763)

EDO

0.053583
(1.280)

0.056271
(1.340)

0.052164
(1.245)

0.054894
(1.306)

ED2

0.048368
(0.731)

0.040226
(0.603)

0.048030
(0.725)

0.040054
(0.601)

ED3

-0.018676
(-0.194)

-0.022004
(-0.228)

-0.017571
(-0.182)

CAR

0.091798"*
(2.185)

0.086200**
(2.024)

-0.108958*
(-1.771)

-0.115645***
(- 1.876)

- 0.020493
(-0.213)
8*

0.093376*
(2.220)

0.088023**
(2.063)

SINGLE

-0.176839*
(- 3.247)

-0.175898*
(-3.225)

-0.175805*
(-3.218)

-0.174435*
(-3.187)

SINGMOM

-0.072595
(-1.217)

-0.062580
(- 1.045)

-0.074699
(- 1.252)

- 0.064748
(- 1.081)

KIDS

-0.043468**
(-2.255)
0.010381***
(1.797)

-0.043742**
(-2.255)

-0.041728*
(-2.155)

0.011154***
(1.917)

0.010086*
(1.743)

0.010808***
(1.854)

0.000143
(0.258)

0.000100
(0.180)

0.000171
(0.309)

0.000133
(0.239)

-0.012317*
(-2.942)

-0.011984*
(-2.855)

-0.012301"
(-2.927)

AGE
AGESQ
TENYRS
TENYRSQ
OBSERVATIONS

0.000170**
(2.209)
3,484
* p < .01
**p < .05

0.000161**
(2.087)

0.000168*
(2.183)

3,469
3,484
p < .10
Note: T statistics are in parentheses.

iS

-0.042006**
(-2.156)

-0.011959*
(-2.839)
it*

0.000159**
(2.060)
3,469

